THEN

When the Framers wrote the Constitution in the summer of 1787, they did not have a ready consensus on how to select the chief executive or define the powers of the office. James Wilson of Pennsylvania wanted the president to be elected by the people, Roger Sherman of Connecticut wanted him elected by Congress. Wilson’s view got almost no support because the size of the United States (in 1787 it was as large as England, Ireland, France, Germany, and Italy combined) made it unlikely that anybody save George Washington could obtain a popular majority. Sherman’s view got a lot of support, but many delegates worried that the president would become nothing more than a tool of Congress. Ultimately, a small subset of the group, the Committee on Postponed Matters, came up with the idea of creating an electoral college to choose the president. The Framers approved the plan, but they expected that most elections would ultimately be decided by the House of Representatives, as they thought candidates would have difficulty winning a majority in the electoral college.

NOW

More than two hundred years later, the electoral college endures, and the House has not chosen a president since 1824. The stability of this institution is surprising, given that the Framers settled on it as a last-minute compromise, and yet it is the only part of the presidential campaign process that the Framers would recognize in the 21st century. The lengthy road to the nomination, extensive fundraising required (in the 2008 presidential race, competitive candidates had raised more than $100 million before the first primary or caucus), and 24-hour media coverage are all standard features of modern presidential selection, and the weighty demands of winning the White House affect how the victorious candidate governs as president. As you read this chapter, think about which features of the American presidency make sense today and which might merit change, keeping in mind that the Framers were not necessarily wedded to all aspects of the institution they created, nor could they have anticipated how technology and other factors would change it.
Professor Jones speaks to his political science class:

The president of the United States occupies one of the most powerful offices in the world. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson sent American troops to Vietnam, President Bush sent them to Saudi Arabia, and President Clinton sent them to Kosovo, all without war being declared by Congress. In fact, Clinton ordered our air force to bomb parts of the old Yugoslavia despite the fact that the House of Representatives had rejected a resolution that would have authorized the bombing. President Nixon imposed wage and price controls on the country. Between them, Presidents Carter and Reagan selected most of the federal judges now on the bench; thus the political philosophies of these two men were stamped on the courts. President George W. Bush created military tribunals to try captured terrorists and persuaded Congress to toughen antiterrorist laws. President Barack Obama, within just months of taking office, got Congress to go along with his plans for giving the executive branch new and sweeping powers to regulate financial markets. No wonder people talk about our having an “imperial presidency.”

A few doors down the hall, Professor Smith speaks to her class:

The president, compared to the prime ministers of other democratic nations, is one of the weakest chief executives anywhere. President Carter signed an arms-limitation treaty with the Soviets, but the Senate wouldn’t ratify it. President Reagan was not allowed even to test antisatellite weapons, and in 1986 Congress rejected his budget before the ink was dry. President Clinton’s health care plan was ignored, and the House voted to impeach him. The federal courts struck down several parts of President Bush’s antiterrorist policies. Even with his party in control of both houses of Congress, President Obama’s first budget proposals were nixed on Capitol Hill, and his first health care reform plans were quickly recast by congressional committee chairpersons. Regularly, subordinates who are supposed to be loyal to the president leak his views to the press and undercut his programs before Congress. No wonder people call the U.S. president a “pitiful, helpless giant.”
Can Professors Jones and Smith be talking about the same office? Who is right? In fact, they are both right. The American presidency is a unique office, with elements of great strength and profound weakness built into it by its constitutional origins.

**Presidents and Prime Ministers**

The popularly elected president is an American invention. Of the roughly five dozen countries in which there is some degree of party competition and thus, presumably, some measure of free choice for the voters, only 16 have a directly elected president, and 13 of these are nations of North and South America. The democratic alternative is for the chief executive to be a prime minister, chosen by and responsible to the parliament. This system prevails in most Western European countries as well as in Israel and Japan. There is no nation with a purely presidential political system in Europe; France combines a directly elected president with a prime minister and parliament.\(^1\)

In a parliamentary system, the prime minister is the chief executive. The prime minister is chosen not by the voters but by the legislature, and he or she in turn selects the other ministers from the members of parliament. If the parliament has only two major parties, the ministers usually will be chosen from the majority party; if there are many parties (as in Israel), several parties may participate in a coalition cabinet. The prime minister remains in power as long as his or her party has a majority of the seats in the legislature or as long as the coalition he or she has assembled holds together. The voters choose who is to be a member of parliament—usually by voting for one or another party—but cannot choose who is to be the chief executive officer. Whether a nation has a presidential or a parliamentary system makes a big difference in the identity and powers of the chief executive.

**Presidents Are Often Outsiders**

People become president by winning elections, and sometimes winning is easier if you can show the voters that you are not part of “the mess in Washington.” Prime ministers are selected from among people already in parliament, and so they are always insiders.

Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush did not hold national office before becoming president. Franklin Roosevelt had been assistant secretary of the navy, but his real political experience was as governor of New York. Dwight Eisenhower was a general, not a politician. John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard Nixon had been in Congress, but only Nixon had had top-level experience in the executive branch (he had been vice president). George H. W. Bush had had a great deal of executive experience in Washington—as vice president, director of the CIA, and representative to China, whereas Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both served as governors. Barack Obama is the third president to be elected directly from the U.S. Senate to the White House—the other two were Warren G. Harding and John F. Kennedy.

Thirty-one different people were elected president between 1828 and 2000. Of these, the great majority were governors, military leaders, or vice presidents; only 13 percent were legislators just before becoming president.
PRESIDENTS CHOOSE CABINET MEMBERS FROM OUTSIDE CONGRESS

Under the Constitution, no sitting member of Congress can hold office in the executive branch. The persons chosen by a prime minister to be in the cabinet are almost always members of parliament.

Of the 15 heads of cabinet-level departments in the first George W. Bush administration, only four had been members of Congress. The rest, as is customary with most presidents, were close personal friends or campaign aides, representatives of important constituencies (for example, farmers, blacks, or women), experts on various policy issues, or some combination of all three. The prime minister of Great Britain, by contrast, picks all of his or her cabinet ministers from among members of Parliament. This is one way by which the prime minister exercises control over the legislature. If you were an ambitious member of Parliament, eager to become prime minister yourself someday, and if you knew that your main chance of realizing that ambition was to be appointed to a series of ever-more-important cabinet posts, then you would not likely antagonize the person doing the appointing.

PRESIDENTS HAVE NO GUARANTEED MAJORITY IN THE LEGISLATURE

A prime minister’s party (or coalition) always has a majority in parliament; if it did not, somebody else would be prime minister. A president’s party often does not have a congressional majority; instead, Congress often is controlled by the opposite party, creating a divided government. Divided government means that cooperation between the two branches, hard to achieve under the best of circumstances, is often further reduced by partisan bickering. Even when one party controls both the White House and Congress, the two branches often work at cross-purposes. The U.S. Constitution created a system of separate branches sharing powers. The authors of the document expected there would be conflict between the branches, and they have not been disappointed.

When Kennedy was president, his party, the Democrats, held a big majority in the House and the Senate. Yet Kennedy was frustrated by his inability to get Congress to approve proposals to enlarge civil rights, supply federal aid for school construction, create a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing, or establish a program of subsidized medical care for the elderly. During his last year in office, Congress passed only about one-fourth of his proposals. Carter did not fare much better; even though the Democrats controlled Congress, many of his most important proposals were defeated or greatly modified. Only Franklin Roosevelt (1933–1945) and Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969) had even brief success in leading Congress, and for Roosevelt most of that success was confined to his first term or to wartime.

PRESIDENTS AND PRIME MINISTERS AT WAR

These differences in political position are illustrated by how George W. Bush and Tony Blair managed the war in Iraq.

• Once Bush decided to fight, he had to cajole Congress, even though it was controlled by his own party, to support him. Once Blair decided to fight, there could not be any meaningful political resistance in Parliament.

• When public opinion turned against Bush, he continued the fight because he could not be removed from office. When public opinion turned against Blair, he announced he would resign from office and turn over the job of prime minister to another person in his party.

Divided Government

In the 58 years between 1952 and 2010, there were 29 congressional elections and 14 presidential elections. Nineteen of the 29 produced divided government—a government in which one party controls the White House and a different party controls one or both houses of Congress. When Barack Obama became president in 2009, it was only the fourth time since 1969 that the same party controlled the White House and Congress, creating a unified government. Eight years earlier, the inauguration of President George W. Bush marked the first time since 1953 that the Republicans were fully in charge of both branches of government (they controlled the White House and the Senate from 1981 to 1987). But not long after the Senate convened, one Republican, James Jeffords of Vermont, announced that he was an independent and voted
with the Democrats. Divided government returned until an additional Republican was elected to the Senate in 2002. But the Democrats retook control in 2007 and increased their majorities in both chambers two years later, even gaining the 60 votes necessary to halt filibusters in the Senate following a contested Minnesota race that ended with Democrat Al Franken being declared the winner and seated. They lost their filibuster-proof majority in 2010, when Republican Scott Brown won a surprise victory to fill the seat of recently deceased Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts. And President Obama faced partially divided government when the 111th Congress convened in January 2011, with a Republican-led House and a narrowly Democratic Senate.

Americans say they don't like divided government. They, or at least the pundits who claim to speak for them, think divided government produces partisan bickering, political paralysis, and policy gridlock. During the 1990 battle between President Bush and a Democratic Congress, one magazine compared it to a movie featuring the Keystone Kops, characters from the silent movies who wildly chased each other around while accomplishing nothing. In the 1992 campaign, Bush, Clinton, and Ross Perot bemoaned the “stalemate” that had developed in Washington. When Clinton was sworn in as president, many commentators spoke approvingly of the “end of gridlock.”

There are two things wrong with these complaints. First, it is not clear that divided government produces a gridlock that is any worse than that which exists with unified government. Second, it is not clear that, even if gridlock does exist, it is always, or even usually, a bad thing for the country.

**DOES GRIDLOCK MATTER?**

Despite the well-publicized stories about presidential budget proposals being ignored by Congress (Democrats used to describe Reagan’s and Bush’s budgets as being “dead on arrival”), it is not easy to tell whether divided governments produce fewer or worse policies than unified ones. The scholars who have looked closely at the matter have, in general, concluded that divided governments do about as well as unified ones in passing important laws, conducting important investigations, and ratifying significant treaties. Political scientist David Mayhew studied 267 important laws that were enacted between 1946 and 1990. These laws were as likely to be passed when different parties controlled the White House and Congress as when the same party controlled both branches. For example, divided governments produced the 1948 Marshall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe and the

**Divided Government at Work: Six Examples**

President George W. Bush and the Democratic-controlled Congress expanded federal laws that fund health care for low-income and elderly citizens.

President Bill Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress overhauled the nation’s welfare system and balanced the federal budget.

President George H. W. Bush and the Democratic-controlled Congress enacted historic legislation to aid disabled persons.

President Ronald Reagan and the Democratic-controlled Congress reformed the federal tax system.

President Richard Nixon and the Democratic-controlled Congress created many new federal environmental policies and programs.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Democratic-controlled Congress established the interstate highway system.

Why do divided governments produce about as much important legislation as unified ones? The main reason is that “unified government” is something of a myth. Just because the Republicans control both the presidency and Congress does not mean that the Republican president and the Republican senators and representatives will see things the same way. For one thing, Republicans are themselves divided between conservatives (mainly from the South) and liberals (mainly from the Northeast and Midwest). They disagree about policy almost as much as Republicans and Democrats disagree. For another thing, the Constitution ensures that the president and Congress will be rivals for power and thus rivals in policymaking. That’s what the separation of powers and checks and balances are all about.

As a result, periods of unified government often turn out not to be so unified. Democratic president Lyndon Johnson could not get many Democratic members of Congress to support his war policy in Vietnam. Democratic president Jimmy Carter could not get the Democratic-controlled Senate to ratify his strategic arms-limitation treaty. Democratic president Bill Clinton could not get the Democratic Congress to go along with his policy on gays in the military or his health proposals; and when the heavily revised Clinton budget did pass in 1993, it was by just one vote.

The only time there really is a unified government is when not just the same party but the same ideological wing of that party is in effective control of both branches of government. This was true in 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt was president and change-oriented Democrats controlled Congress, and it was true again in 1965 when Lyndon Johnson and liberal Democrats dominated Congress. Both were periods when major policy initiatives became law: Social Security, business regulations, Medicare, and civil rights legislation. But these periods of ideologically unified government are very rare.

**IS POLICY GRIDLOCK BAD?**

An American president has less ability to decide what laws get passed than does a British prime minister. If you think the job of a president is to “lead the country,” that weakness will worry you. The only cure for that weakness is either to change the Constitution so that our government resembles the parliamentary system in effect in Great Britain, or always to vote into office members of Congress who not only are of the same party as the president but also agree with him on policy issues.

We suspect that even Americans who hate gridlock and want more leadership aren’t ready to make sweeping constitutional changes or to stop voting for presidents and members of Congress from different parties. This unwillingness suggests they like the idea of somebody being able to block a policy he or she doesn’t like. Since all of us don’t like something, we all have an interest in some degree of gridlock.

And we seem to protect that interest. In a typical presidential election, about one-fourth of all voters will vote for one party’s candidate for president and the other party’s candidate for Congress. As a result, about one-fourth of all congressional districts will be represented in the House by a person who does not belong to the party of the president who carried that district. Some scholars believe that voters split tickets deliberately in order to create divided government and thus magnify the effects of the checks and balances built into our system, but the evidence supporting this belief is not conclusive.

Gridlock, to the extent that it exists, is a necessary consequence of a system of representative democracy. Such a system causes delays, intensifies deliberations, forces compromises, and requires the creation of broad-based coalitions to support most new policies. This system is the opposite of direct democracy. If you believe in direct democracy, you believe that what the people want on some issue should become law with as little fuss and bother as possible. Political gridlocks are like traffic gridlocks—people get overheated, things boil over, nothing moves, and nobody wins except journalists who write about the mess and lobbyists who charge big fees to steer their clients around the tie-up. In a direct democracy, the president would be a traffic cop with broad powers to decide in what direction the traffic should move and to make sure that it moves that way.

But if unified governments are not really unified—if in fact they are split by ideological differences within each party and by the institutional rivalries between the president and Congress—then this change is less important than it may seem. What is important is the relative power of the president and Congress. That has changed greatly.
Chapter 14  The Presidency

The Presidency

The Powers of the President

Though the president, unlike a prime minister, cannot command an automatic majority in the legislature, he does have some formidable, albeit vaguely defined, powers. These are mostly set forth in Article II of the Constitution and are of two sorts: those he can exercise in his own right without formal legislative approval, and those that require the consent of the Senate or of Congress as a whole.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT ALONE

- Serve as commander in chief of the armed forces
- Commission officers of the armed forces
- Grant reprieves and pardons for federal offenses (except impeachment)
- Convene Congress in special sessions
- Receive ambassadors

HOW WE COMPARE

Presidential Systems

Most modern democracies feature one of three systems:

- Parliamentary systems (like the United Kingdom) in which prime ministers are selected by a legislative majority and can be removed by a legislative majority at virtually any time;
- Presidential systems (like the United States) in which the president and the legislators are separately elected and serve fixed terms, with the president subject to removal by the legislature only under extreme circumstances (for example, in the United States, impeachment by the House and removal from office by the Senate); or
- Semi-presidential systems (like France) in which there is a prime minister selected and subject to removal by a parliamentary majority, as well as a president who is separately elected.

Using a multidimensional definition of “democratic,” in 1950, about 60 percent of democratic nations had parliamentary systems, 30 percent had semi-presidential systems, and 10 percent had presidential systems. Today, however, about two-thirds of all democratic nations have either semi-presidential (about 36 percent) or presidential (about 30 percent) systems.

Are elected officials and party leaders in presidential systems like that in the United States more or less likely to deliver on campaign promises than are their counterparts in the other two systems? The most in-depth studies to date say “less likely”: The rate at which a party in power pursues the policies it offered to voters in its platform is generally lower in presidential systems; and the incidence of “policy-switching” (pursuing policies directly contrary to those promised during the campaign) is more than four times as common in presidential systems as it is in parliamentary systems, with semi-presidential systems being in the middle.


A military officer carrying "the football"—the briefcase containing the secret codes the president can use to launch a nuclear attack.
• Take care that the laws be faithfully executed
• Wield the “executive power”
• Appoint officials to lesser offices

POWERS THE PRESIDENT SHARES WITH THE SENATE
• Make treaties
• Appoint ambassadors, judges, and high officials

POWERS THE PRESIDENT SHARES WITH CONGRESS AS A WHOLE
• Approve legislation

Taken alone and interpreted narrowly, this list of powers is not very impressive. Obviously, the president’s authority as commander in chief is important, but literally construed, most of the other constitutional grants seem to provide for little more than a president who is chief clerk of the country. A hundred years after the Founding, that is about how matters appeared to even the most astute observers. In 1884, Woodrow Wilson wrote a book about American politics titled Congressional Government, in which he described the business of the president as “usually not much above routine,” mostly “mere administration.” The president might as well be an officer of the civil service. To succeed, he need only obey Congress and stay alive.5

But even as Wilson wrote, he was overlooking some examples of enormously powerful presidents, such as Lincoln, and was not sufficiently attentive to the potential for presidential power to be found in the more ambiguous clauses of the Constitution as well as in the political realities of American life. The president’s authority as commander in chief has grown—even, but not only, in wartime—to encompass not simply the direction of the military forces, but also the management of the economy and the direction of foreign affairs as well. A quietly dramatic reminder of the awesome implications of the president’s military powers occurs at the precise instant that a new president assumes office. A military officer carrying a locked briefcase moves from the side of the outgoing president to the side of the new one. In the briefcase are the secret codes and orders that permit the president to authorize the launching of American nuclear weapons.

The president’s duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” has become one of the most elastic phrases in the Constitution. By interpreting this broadly, Grover Cleveland was able to use federal troops to break a labor strike in the 1890s, and Dwight Eisenhower was able to send troops to help integrate a public school in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.

The greatest source of presidential power, however, is not found in the Constitution at all but in politics and public opinion. Increasingly since the 1930s, Congress has passed laws that confer on the executive branch broad grants of authority to achieve some general goals, leaving it up to the president

How Things Work

The President: Qualifications and Benefits

Qualifications
• A natural-born citizen (can be born abroad of parents who are American citizens)
• 35 years of age
• A resident of the United States for at least 14 years (but not necessarily the 14 years just preceding the election)

Benefits
• A nice house
• A salary of $400,000 per year (taxable)

• An expense account of $50,000 per year (tax-free)
• Travel expenses of $100,000 per year (tax-free)
• A pension, on retirement, equal to the pay of a cabinet member (taxable)
• Staff support and Secret Service protection for 10 years on leaving the presidency
• A White House staff of 400 to 500
• A place in the country—Camp David
• A personal airplane—Air Force One
• A fine chef
and his deputies to define the regulations and programs that will actually be put into effect. In Chapter 15, we shall see how this delegation of legislative power to the president has contributed to the growth of the bureaucracy. Moreover, the American people—always in times of crisis, but increasingly as an everyday matter—look to the president for leadership and hold him responsible for a large and growing portion of our national affairs. The public thinks, wrongly, that the presidency is the “first branch” of government.

### The Evolution of the Presidency

Ironically, given the preeminence of the presidency in American politics today, few issues inspired as much debate or concern among the Framers in 1787 as the problem of defining the chief executive. The delegates feared anarchy and monarchy in about equal measure. When the Constitutional Convention met, the existing state constitutions gave most, if not all, power to the legislatures. In eight states, the governor actually was chosen by the legislature, and in ten states, the governor could not serve more than one year. Only in New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut did governors have much power or serve for any length of time.

Some of the Framers proposed a plural national executive (that is, several people would each hold the executive power in different areas, or they would exercise the power as a committee). Others wanted the executive power checked, as it was in Massachusetts, by a council that would have to approve many of the chief executive’s actions. Alexander Hamilton strongly urged the exact opposite: in a five-hour speech, he called for something very much like an elective monarchy, patterned in some respects after the British kind. No one paid much attention to this plan or even, at first, to the more modest (and ultimately successful) suggestion of James Wilson for a single, elected president.

In time, those who won out believed that the governing of a large nation, especially one threatened by foreign enemies, required a single president with significant powers. Their cause was aided, no doubt, by the fact that everybody assumed George Washington would be the first president, and confidence in him—and in his sense of self-restraint—was widely shared. Even so, several delegates feared the presidency would become, in the words of Edmund Randolph of Virginia, “the foetus of monarchy.”

### Concerns of the Founders

The delegates in Philadelphia, and later the critics of the new Constitution during the debate over its ratification, worried about aspects of the presidency that were quite different from those that concern us today. In 1787–1789, some Americans suspected that the president, by being able to command the state militia, would use the militia to overpower state governments. Others were worried that if the president were allowed to share treaty-making power with the Senate, he would be “directed by minions and favorites” and become a “tool of the Senate.”

But the most frequent concern was over the possibility of presidential re-election: Americans in the late 18th century were sufficiently suspicious of human nature and sufficiently experienced in the arts of mischievous government to believe that a president, once elected, would arrange to stay in office in perpetuity by resorting to bribery, intrigue, and force. This might happen, for example, every time the presidential election was thrown into the House of Representatives because no candidate had received a majority of the votes in the electoral college, a situation that most people expected to happen frequently.

In retrospect, these concerns seem misplaced, even foolish. The power over the militia has had little significance; the election has gone to the House only twice (1800 and 1824); and though the Senate dominated the presidency off and on during the second half of the 19th century, it has not done so recently. The real sources of the expansion of presidential power—the president’s role in foreign affairs, his ability to shape public opinion, his position as head of the executive branch, and his claims to have certain “inherent” powers by virtue of his office—were hardly predictable in 1787. And not surprisingly. There was nowhere in the world at that time, nor had there been at any time in history, an example of an American-style presidency. It was a unique and unprecedented institution, and the Framers and their critics can easily be forgiven for not predicting accurately how it would evolve. At a more general level, however, they understood the issue quite clearly. Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania put the problem of the presidency this way: “Make him too weak: the Legislature will usurp his powers. Make him too strong: he will usurp on the Legislature.”

The Framers knew very well that the relations between the president and Congress and the manner in which the president is elected were of profound importance, and they debated both at great length. The first plan was for Congress to elect the president—in short, for the system to be quasi-parliamentary. But if that were done, some
delegates pointed out, Congress could dominate an honest or lazy president, while a corrupt or scheming president might dominate Congress.

After much discussion, it was decided that the president should be chosen directly by voters. But by which voters? The emerging nation was large and diverse. It seemed unlikely that every citizen would be familiar enough with the candidates to cast an informed vote for a president directly. Worse, a direct popular election would give inordinate weight to the large, populous states, and no plan with that outcome had any chance of adoption by the smaller states.

**THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE**

Thus the electoral college was invented, whereby each of the states would select electors in whatever manner it wished. The electors would then meet in each state capital and vote for president and vice president. Many Framers expected that this procedure would lead to each state’s electors’ voting for a favorite son, and thus no candidate would win a majority of the popular vote. In this event, it was decided, the House of Representatives should make the choice, with each state delegation casting one vote.

The plan seemed to meet every test: large states would have their say, but small states would be protected by having a minimum of three electoral votes no matter how tiny their population. The small states together could wield considerable influence in the House, where, it was widely expected, most presidential elections would ultimately be decided. Of course, it did not work out quite this way: the Framers did not foresee the role that political parties would play in producing nationwide support for a slate of national candidates.

Once the manner of electing the president was settled, the question of his powers was much easier to decide. After all, if you believe the procedures are fair and balanced, then you are more confident in assigning larger powers to the president within this system. Accordingly, the right to make treaties and the right to appoint lesser officials, originally reserved for the Senate, were given to the president “with the advice and consent of the Senate.”

**THE PRESIDENT’S TERM OF OFFICE**

Another issue was put to rest soon thereafter. George Washington, the unanimous choice of the electoral college to be the first president, firmly limited himself to two terms in office (1789–1797), and no president until Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–1945) dared to run for more (though Ulysses S. Grant tried). In 1951, the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, formally limiting all subsequent presidents to two terms. The remaining issues concerning the nature of the presidency, and especially the relations between the president and Congress, have been the subject of continuing dispute. The pattern of relationships that we see today is the result of an evolutionary process that has extended over more than two centuries. The first problem was to establish the legitimacy of the presidency itself: that is, to ensure, if possible, public acceptance of the office, its incumbent, and its powers and to establish an orderly transfer of power from one incumbent to the next.

Today, we take this for granted. When George W. Bush was inaugurated in January 2001 as our 43rd president, Bill Clinton, the 42nd, quietly left the White House. In the world today, such an uneventful succession is unusual. In many nations, a new chief executive comes to power with the aid of military force or as a result of political intrigue; his predecessor often leaves office disgraced, exiled, or dead. At the time the Constitution was written, the Founders could only hope that an orderly transfer of power from one president to the next would occur. France had just undergone a bloody revolution; England in the not-too-distant past had beheaded a king; and in Poland the ruler was elected by a process so manifestly corrupt and so open to intrigue that Thomas Jefferson, in what may be the first example of ethnic humor in American politics, was led to refer to the proposed American presidency as a “bad edition of a Polish king.”

Yet by the time Abraham Lincoln found himself at the helm of a nation plunged into a bitter, bloody civil war, 15 presidents had been elected, served their time, and left office without a hint of force being used to facilitate the process and with the people accepting the process—if not admiring all the presidents. This orderly transfer of authority occurred despite passionate opposition and deeply divisive elections (such as that which brought Jefferson to power). And it did not happen by accident.

**THE FIRST PRESIDENTS**

Those who first served as president were among the most prominent men in the new nation, all active either in the movement for independence or in the Founding or in both. Of the first five presidents,
four (all but John Adams) served two full terms. Washington and Monroe were not even opposed. The first administration had at the highest levels the leading spokesmen for all of the major viewpoints: Alexander Hamilton was Washington's secretary of the treasury (and was sympathetic to the urban commercial interests), and Thomas Jefferson was secretary of state (and more inclined toward rural, small-town, and farming views). Washington spoke out strongly against political parties, and though parties soon emerged, there was a stigma attached to them: many people believed that it was wrong to take advantage of divisions in the country, to organize deliberately to acquire political office, or to make legislation depend upon party advantage. As it turned out, this hostility to party (or “faction,” as it was more commonly called) was unrealistic: parties are as natural to democracy as churches are to religion.

Establishing the legitimacy of the presidency in the early years was made easier by the fact that the national government had relatively little to do. It had, of course, to establish a sound currency and to settle the debt accrued during the Revolutionary War. The Treasury Department inevitably became the principal federal office, especially under the strong leadership of Hamilton. Relations with England and France were important—and difficult—but otherwise government took little time and few resources.

In appointing people to federal office, a general rule of “fitness” emerged: those appointed should have some standing in their communities and be well thought of by their neighbors. Appointments based on partisanship soon arose, but community stature could not be neglected. The presidency was kept modest. Washington clearly had not sought the office and did not relish the exercise of its then modest powers. He traveled widely so that as many people as possible could see their new president. His efforts to establish a semi-regal court etiquette were quickly rebuffed; the presidency was to be kept simple. Congress decided that not until after a president was dead might his likeness appear on a coin or on currency; no president until Eisenhower was given a pension on his retirement.

The president’s relations with Congress were correct but not close. Washington appeared before the Senate to ask its advice on a proposed treaty with some Indian tribes. He got none and instead was politely told that the Senate would like to consider the matter in private. He declared that he would be “damned if he ever went there again,” and he never did. Thus ended the responsibility of the Senate to “advise” the president. Vetoes were sometimes cast by the president, but sparingly, and only when the president believed the law was not simply unwise but unconstitutional. Washington cast only two vetoes; Jefferson and Adams cast none.

THE JACKSONIANS

At a time roughly corresponding to the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–1837), broad changes began to occur in American politics. These changes, together with the personality of Jackson himself, altered the relations between the president and...
President Andrew Jackson thought of himself as the "Tribune of the People," and he symbolized this by throwing a White House party that anyone could attend. Hundreds of people showed up and ate or carried away most of a 1,400-pound block of cheese.

Congress and the nature of presidential leadership. As so often happens, few people at the time Jackson took office had much sense of what his presidency would be like. Though he had been a member of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, he was elected as a military hero—and an apparently doddering one at that. Sixty-one years old and seemingly frail, he nonetheless used the powers of his office as no one before him had.

Jackson vetoed 12 acts of Congress, more than all his predecessors combined and more than any subsequent president until Andrew Johnson 30 years later. His vetoes were not simply on constitutional grounds but on policy ones: as the only official elected by the entire voting citizenry, he saw himself as the "Tribune of the People." None of his vetoes were overridden. He did not initiate many new policies, but he struck out against the ones he did not like. He did so at a time when the size of the electorate was increasing rapidly, and new states, especially in the West, had entered the Union. (There were then 24 states in the Union, nearly twice the original number.)

Jackson demonstrated what could be done by a popular president. He did not shrink from conflict with Congress, and the tension between the two branches of government that was intended by the Framers became intensified by the personalities of those in government: Jackson in the White House, and Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John Calhoun in Congress. These powerful figures walked the political stage at a time when bitter sectional conflicts—over slavery and commercial policies—were beginning to split the country. Jackson, though he was opposed to a large and powerful federal government and wished to return somehow to the agrarian simplicities of Jefferson's time, was nonetheless a believer in a strong and independent presidency. This view, though obscured by nearly a century of subsequent congressional dominance of national politics, was ultimately to triumph—for better or for worse.

THE REEMERGENCE OF CONGRESS

With the end of Jackson's second term, Congress quickly reestablished its power, and except for the wartime presidency of Lincoln and brief flashes of presidential power under James Polk (1845–1849) and Grover Cleveland (1885–1889, 1893–1897), the presidency for a hundred years was the subordinate branch of the national government. Of the eight presidents who succeeded Jackson, two (William H. Harrison and Zachary Taylor) died in office, and none of the others served more than one term. Schoolchildren, trying to memorize the list of American presidents, always stumble in this era of the "no-name" presidents. This is hardly a coincidence: Congress was the leading institution, struggling, unsuccessfully, with slavery and sectionalism.

It was also an intensely partisan era, a legacy of Jackson that lasted well into the 20th century. Public opinion was closely divided. In nine of the 17 presidential elections between the end of Jackson's term in 1837 and Theodore Roosevelt's election in 1904, the winning candidate received less than half the popular vote. Only two candidates (Lincoln in 1864 and Ulysses S. Grant in 1872) received more than 55 percent of the popular vote.

During this long period of congressional—and usually senatorial—dominance of national government, only Lincoln broke new ground for presidential power. Lincoln's expansive use of that power, like Jackson's, was totally unexpected. He was first elected in 1860 as a minority president, receiving less than 40 percent of the popular vote in a field of four candidates. Though a member of the new Republican party, he had been a member of the Whig party, a group that had stood for limiting presidential power. He had opposed America's entry into the Mexican War and had been critical of Jackson's use of executive authority. But as president during the Civil War, he made unprecedented use of the vague powers in Article II of the Constitution, especially those that he felt were "implied" or "inherent" in the phrase "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and in the express authorization for him to act as commander in chief. Lincoln raised an army, spent money, blockaded southern ports, temporarily suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and...
Chapter 14 The Presidency

Until November 2000, it was almost impossible to get a student interested in the electoral college. But in the 2000 presidential election, Florida’s electoral vote hung in the balance for weeks, with Bush finally winning it and (though he had fewer popular votes than Al Gore) the presidency.

Here are the essential facts: each state gets electoral votes equal to the number of its senators and representatives (the District of Columbia also gets 3, even though it has no representatives in Congress). There are 538 electoral votes. To win, a candidate must receive at least half, or 270.

In all but two states, the candidate who wins the most popular votes wins all of the state’s electoral votes. Maine and Nebraska have a different system. They allow electoral votes to be split by awarding some votes on the basis of a candidate’s statewide total and some on the basis of how the candidate did in each congressional district.

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**The Electoral College**

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**How Things Work**

**The Electoral College**

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The distribution of electoral college votes per state is for the 2012 presidential election, based on the 2010 Census. The colors indicate which states voted Democratic and Republican (or both, in one case) in 2008, but the distribution of electoral college votes per state was different in 2008. In 2008, Obama won 365 electoral college votes, but the same states in 2012 would bring 359 electoral votes, as the bar graph shows (which is still well above the 270-vote minimum required to win in the electoral college).

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issued the Emancipation Proclamation to free the slaves—all without prior congressional approval. He justified this, as most Americans probably would have, by the emergency conditions created by civil war. In this he acted little differently from Thomas Jefferson, who while president waged undeclared war against various North African pirates.

After Lincoln, Congress reasserted its power and became, during Reconstruction and for many decades thereafter, the principal federal institution. But it had become abundantly clear that a national emergency could equip the president with great powers and that a popular and strong-willed president could expand his powers even without an emergency.

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The winning slates of electors assemble in their state capitals about six weeks after the election to cast their ballots. Ordinarily this is a pure formality. Occasionally, however, an elector will vote for a presidential candidate other than the one who carried the state. Such “faithless electors” have appeared in several elections since 1796. The state electoral ballots are opened and counted before a joint session of Congress during the first week of January. The candidate with a majority is declared elected.

If no candidate wins a majority, the House of Representatives chooses the president from among the three leading candidates, with each state casting one vote. By House rules, each state’s vote is allotted to the candidate preferred by a majority of the state’s House delegation. If there is a tie within a delegation, that state’s vote is not counted.

The House has had to decide two presidential contests. In 1800, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied in the electoral college because of a defect in the language of the Constitution—each state cast two electoral votes, without indicating which was for president and which for vice president. [Burr was supposed to be vice president, and after much maneuvering he was.] This problem was corrected by the Twelfth Amendment, ratified in 1804. The only House decision under the modern system was in 1824, when it chose John Quincy Adams over Andrew Jackson and William H. Crawford, even though Jackson had more electoral votes (and probably more popular votes) than his rivals.

Today the winner-takes-all system in effect in 48 states makes it possible for a candidate to win at least 270 electoral votes without winning a majority of the popular votes. This happened in 2000, 1888, and 1876, and almost happened in 1960 and 1884. Today a candidate who carries the 10 largest states wins 256 electoral votes, only 14 short of a presidential victory.

This means that the candidates have a strong incentive to campaign hard in big states they have a chance of winning. In 2000, Gore worked hard in California, New York, and Pennsylvania but pretty much ignored Texas, where Bush was a shoo-in. Bush campaigned hard in Florida, Illinois, and Ohio, but not so much in New York, where Gore was an easy winner.

But the electoral college can also help small states. South Dakota, for example, has 3 electoral votes (about 0.5 percent of the total), even though it casts only about 0.3 percent of the popular vote. South Dakota and other small states are thus overrepresented in the electoral college.

Most Americans would like to abolish the electoral college. But doing away with it entirely would have some unforeseen effects. If we relied just on the popular vote, there might have to be a runoff election among the two leading candidates if neither got a majority because third-party candidates won a lot of votes. This would encourage the formation of third parties (we might have a Jesse Jackson party, a Pat Buchanan party, a Pat Robertson party, and a Ralph Nader party). Each third party would then be in a position to negotiate with one of the two major parties between the first election and the runoff about favors it wanted in return for its support. American presidential politics might come to look like the multiparty systems in France and Italy.

There are other changes that could be made. One is for each state to allocate its electoral votes proportional to the popular vote the candidates receive in that state. Voters in Colorado acted on that measure in November 2004, but that proposal failed. If every state did that, several past elections would have been decided in the House of Representatives because no candidate got a majority of the popular vote.

And the electoral college serves a larger purpose: it makes candidates worry about carrying states as well as popular votes, and so heightens the influence of states in national politics.

Except for the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) and Woodrow Wilson (1913–1921), the president was, until the New Deal, at best a negative force—a source of opposition to Congress, not a source of initiative and leadership for it. Grover Cleveland was a strong personality, but for all his efforts he was able to do little more than veto bills that he did not like. He cast 414 vetoes—more than any other president until Franklin Roosevelt. A frequent target of his vetoes were bills to confer special pensions on Civil War veterans.

Today we are accustomed to thinking that the president formulates a legislative program to which
Congress then responds, but until the 1930s the opposite was more the case. Congress ignored the initiatives of such presidents as Grover Cleveland, Rutherford Hayes, Chester Arthur, and Calvin Coolidge. Woodrow Wilson in 1913 was the first president since John Adams to deliver personally the State of the Union address, and he was one of the first to develop and argue for a presidential legislative program.

Our popular conception of the president as the central figure of national government, devising a legislative program and commanding a large staff of advisers, is very much a product of the modern era and of the enlarged role of government. In the past, the presidency became powerful only during a national crisis (the Civil War, World War I) or because of an extraordinary personality (Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson). Since the 1930s, however, the presidency has been powerful no matter who occupied the office and whether or not there was a crisis. Because government now plays such an active role in our national life, the president is the natural focus of attention and the titular head of a huge federal administrative system (whether he is the real boss is another matter).

But the popular conception of the president as the central figure of national government belies the realities of present-day legislative-executive relations. During national policymaking from the Eisenhower years through the Reagan administration, Congress, not the president, often took the lead in setting the legislative agenda. For example, the 1990 Clean Air Act, like the 1970 Clean Air Act before it, was born and bred mainly by congressional, not presidential, action. Indeed, administration officials played almost no role in the legislative process that culminated in these laws. When President Bush signed the 1990 Clean Air Act or President Clinton signed the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, each took credit for it, but in fact both bills were designed by members of Congress, not by the president. Likewise, although presidents dominated budget policymaking from the 1920s into the early 1970s, they no longer do. Instead, the “imperatives of the budgetary process have pushed congressional leaders to center stage.” Thus, as often as not, Congress proposes, the president disposes, and legislative-executive relations involve hard bargaining and struggle between these two branches of government.

**The Power to Persuade**

The sketchy constitutional powers given the president, combined with the lack of an assured legislative majority, mean that he must rely heavily on persuasion if he is to accomplish much. Here, the Constitution gives him some advantages: he and the vice president are the only officials elected by the whole nation, and he is the ceremonial head of state as well as the chief executive of the government. The president can use his national constituency and ceremonial duties to enlarge his power, but he must do so quickly: the second half of his first term in office will be devoted to running for reelection, especially if he faces opposition for his own party’s nomination (as was the case with Carter and Ford).

**The Three Audiences**

The president’s persuasive powers are aimed at three audiences. The first, and often the most important, is his Washington, D.C., audience of fellow politicians and leaders. As Richard Neustadt points out in his book *Presidential Power*, a president’s reputation among his Washington colleagues is of great importance in affecting how much deference his views receive and thus how much power he can wield. If a president is thought to be “smart,” “sure of himself,” “cool,” “on top of things,” or “shrewd,” and thus “effective,” he will be effective. Franklin Roosevelt had that reputation, and so did Lyndon Johnson, at least for his first few years in office. Truman, Ford, and Carter often did not have that reputation, and they lost ground accordingly. Power, like beauty, exists largely in the eye of the beholder.

A second audience is composed of party activists and officeholders outside Washington—the partisan grassroots. These persons want the president to exemplify their principles, trumpet their slogans, appeal to their fears and hopes, and help them get reelected. Since, as we explained in Chapter 9, partisan activists increasingly have an ideological orientation toward national politics, these people will expect “their” president to make fire-and-brimstone speeches that confirm in them a shared sense of purpose and, incidentally, help them raise money from contributors to state and local campaigns.

The third audience is “the public.” But of course that audience is really many publics, each with a different view or set of interests. A president on the campaign trail speaks boldly of what he will accomplish; a president in office speaks quietly of the problems that must be overcome. Citizens often are irritated at the apparent tendency of officeholders, including the president, to sound mealy-mouthed and equivocal. But it is easy to criticize the cooking when you haven’t been the cook. A president learns quickly that every utterance will be scrutinized closely by the media and by organized groups here and abroad, and errors of fact, judgment, timing, or even inflection will be immediately and forcefully pointed out. Given the risks of saying too much, it is a wonder that presidents say anything at all.
Do a President’s Communication Skills Matter?

Barack Obama garnered national attention in 2004 for his eloquent keynote address at the Democratic National Convention about “the audacity of hope” (a phrase that he later used as a book title). Four years later, his speeches propelled his successful candidacy for the White House. Obama’s rhetorical skills were important for his presidential campaign, but for governing, how much does a president’s ability to communicate matter?

The Framers of the Constitution probably would have said, “not much.” After all, they wanted to keep some distance between the president and the public, as their creation of an electoral college to select the president indicates (see box on p. 376). The Constitution states that the president “shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,” but it does not require a presidential speech; indeed, presidents from Thomas Jefferson through William Howard Taft sent their state of the union messages in writing to Congress.

Presidential public communication has become more important since the early 20th century. Woodrow Wilson resumed the custom started by the first two presidents of delivering state of the union messages in person to Congress. Presidential scholar Richard E. Neustadt wrote in 1960 of the need for presidents to appeal to multiple constituencies, and he emphasized the importance of “public prestige,” for which a president must be “effective as a teacher to the public.”

Political scientists and communication scholars have identified the use of public rhetoric as a political strategy by presidents in modern American politics. Samuel Kernell shows how modern presidents routinely employ a practice of “going public” to build popular support for their policies, and Jeffrey K. Tulis examines the development of the “rhetorical presidency,” in which presidents use public speeches to exercise popular leadership. Mary E. Stuckey finds that advances in media technology shape what presidents say and how they do so, while Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson evaluate how presidents use rhetorical opportunities to exercise political influence with the other institutions of government.

Despite all of the time and energy that presidents invest in their public communications, however, their efforts may not yield the results they seek. Based on extensive analysis of public opinion polls, George C. Edwards III argues that presidential speeches serve to bolster existing public views rather than to change them—the “bully pulpit,” he says, falls “on deaf ears.” Jeffrey E. Cohen examines media coverage of the presidency and finds that presidents can influence segments of the public through local news coverage, but that national strategies of “going public” are less successful.

Will presidents continue to devote significant resources to their public communications? Absolutely. Will doing so help them to achieve their political and policy goals? Probably not very much. The Framers appear to be correct, albeit for different reasons—they did not think presidents should “go public,” and while presidents do so routinely today, they typically don’t get a lot for their efforts.


POPCULARITY AND INFLUENCE

The object of all this talk is to convert personal popularity into congressional support for the president’s legislative programs (and improved chances for reelection). It is not obvious, of course, why Congress should care about a president’s popularity. After all, as we saw in Chapter 13, most members of Congress are secure in their seats, and few need fear any “party bosses” who might deny them renomination. Moreover, the president cannot ordinarily provide credible electoral rewards or penalties to members of Congress. By working for their defeat in the 1938 congressional election, President Roosevelt attempted to “purge” members of Congress who opposed his program, but he failed. Nor does presidential support help a particular member of Congress: most representatives win reelection anyway, and the few who are in trouble are rarely saved by presidential intervention. When President Reagan campaigned hard for Republican senatorial candidates in 1986, he, too, failed to have much impact.

For a while, scholars thought congressional candidates might benefit from the president’s coattails: they might ride into office on the strength of the popularity of a president of their own party. It is true, as can be seen from Table 14.1, that a winning president will often find that his party’s strength in Congress increases.

But there are good reasons to doubt whether the pattern observed in Table 14.1 is the result of presidential coattails. For one thing, there are some exceptions.

**Table 14.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gains or Losses of President’s Party In:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>+22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Eisenhower</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Johnson</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Nixon</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Carter</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>+33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Reagan</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Bush</td>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eisenhower won 57.4 percent of the vote in 1956, but the Republicans lost seats in the House and Senate. Kennedy won in 1960, but the Democrats lost seats in the House and gained but one in the Senate. When Nixon was reelected in 1972 with one of the largest majorities in history, the Republicans lost seats in the Senate.

Careful studies of voter attitudes and of how presidential and congressional candidates fare in the same districts suggest that, whatever may once have been the influence of coattails, their effect has declined in recent years and is quite small today. The weakening of party loyalty and of party organizations, combined with the enhanced ability of members of Congress to build secure relations with their constituents, has tended to insulate congressional elections from presidential ones. When voters choose as members of Congress people of the same party as an incoming president, they probably do so out of desire for a general change and as an adverse judgment about the outgoing party’s performance as a whole, not because they want to supply the new president with members of Congress favorable to him.¹¹ The big increase in Republican senators and representatives that accompanied the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 was probably as much a result of the unpopularity of the outgoing president and the circumstances of various local races as it was of Reagan’s coattails.

Nonetheless, a president’s personal popularity may have a significant effect on how much of his program Congress passes, even if it does not affect the reelection chances of those members of Congress. Though they do not fear a president who threatens to campaign against them (or cherish one who promises to support them), members of Congress do have a sense that it is risky to oppose too adamantly the policies of a popular president. Politicians share a sense of a common fate: they tend to rise or fall together. Statistically, a president’s popularity, as measured by the Gallup poll (see Figure 14.1), is associated with the proportion of his legislative proposals approved by Congress (see Figure 14.2). Other things equal, the more popular the president, the higher the proportion of his bills Congress will pass.

But use these figures with caution. How successful a president is with Congress depends not just on the numbers reported here, but on a lot of other factors as well. First, he can be “successful” on a big bill or on a trivial one. If he is successful on a lot of small matters and never on a big one, the measure of presidential victories does not tell us much. Second, a president can keep his victory score high by not taking a position on any controversial measure. (President Carter made his views known on only 22 percent of the House votes, while President Eisenhower made his views known on 56 percent of those votes.) Third, a president can appear successful if a few bills he likes are passed, but most of his legislative program is bottled up in Congress and never comes to a vote. Given these problems, “presidential victories” are hard to measure accurately.

A fourth general caution: presidential popularity is hard to predict and can be greatly influenced by factors over which nobody, including the president, has much control. For example, when he took

Note: Popularity was measured by asking every few months, “Do you approve of the way _________ is handling his job as president?”

office in 2001, President George W. Bush’s approval rating was 57 percent, nearly identical to what President Bill Clinton received in his initial rating (58 percent) in 1993. But Bush also had the highest initial disapproval rating (25 percent) of any president since polling began. This was undoubtedly partly due to his becoming president on the heels of the Florida vote-count controversy (see Chapter 10). Bush’s approval ratings through his first six months were fairly typical for post-1960 presidents. But from the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 through mid-2002, his approval ratings never dipped below 70 percent, and the approval ratings he received shortly after the attack (hovering around 90 percent) were the highest ever recorded. President Barack Obama’s approval rating averaged 63 percent in his first six months in office, but as unemployment neared 10 percent, his popularity decreased, falling below 45 percent by the 2010 midterm elections. In the first half of 2011, however, Obama’s approval ratings typically averaged between 45 and 50 percent.

**THE DECLINE IN POPULARITY**

Though presidential popularity is an asset, its value tends inexorably to decline. As can be seen from Figure 14.1, every president except Eisenhower, Reagan, and Clinton lost popular support between his inauguration and the time that he left office, except when his reelection gave him a brief burst of renewed popularity. Truman was hurt by improprieties among his subordinates and by the protracted Korean War; Johnson was crippled by the increasing unpopularity of the Vietnam War; Nixon was severely damaged by the Watergate scandal; Ford was hurt by having pardoned Nixon for his part in Watergate; Carter was weakened by continuing inflation, staff irregularities, and the Iranian kidnapping of American hostages; George H. W. Bush was harmed by an economic recession. George W. Bush suffered from public criticism of the war in Iraq.

Because a president’s popularity tends to be highest right after an election, political commentators like to speak of a “honeymoon,” during which, presumably, the president’s love affair with the people and with Congress can be consummated. Certainly, Roosevelt enjoyed such a honeymoon. In the legendary “first hundred days” of his presidency, from March to June 1933, FDR obtained from a willing Congress a vast array of new laws creating new agencies and authorizing new powers. But those were extraordinary times: the most serious economic depression of that century had put millions out of work, closed banks, impoverished farmers, and ruined the stock market. It would have been political suicide for Congress to have blocked, or even delayed, action on measures that appeared designed to help the nation out of the crisis.

Other presidents, serving in more normal times, have not enjoyed such a honeymoon. Truman had little success with what he proposed; Eisenhower proposed little. Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, and Carter

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Figure 14.2

**Presidential Victories on Votes in Congress, 1953–2010**

![Graph showing presidential victories on votes in Congress, 1953–2010.](image)

Note: Percentages indicate number of congressional votes supporting the president divided by the total number of votes on which the president has taken a position.

had some victories in their first year in office, but nothing that could be called a honeymoon. Only Lyndon Johnson enjoyed a highly productive relationship with Congress; until the Vietnam War sapped his strength, he rarely lost. Reagan began his administration with important victories in his effort to cut expenditures and taxes, but in his second year in office he ran into trouble.

The decay in the reputation of the president and his party in midterm is evident in Table 14.2. Since 1934, in every off-year election but two, the president’s party has lost seats in one or both houses of Congress. In 1998, the Democrats won five seats in the House and lost none in the Senate; in 2002, the Republicans gained eight House seats and two in the Senate. The ability of the president to persuade is important but limited. However, he also has a powerful bargaining chip to play: the ability to say no.

### The Power to Say No

The Constitution gives the president the power to veto legislation. In addition, most presidents have asserted the right of “executive privilege,” or the right to withhold information that Congress may want to obtain from the president or his subordinates, and some presidents have tried to impound funds appropriated by Congress. These efforts by the president to say no are not only a way of blocking action but also a way of forcing Congress to bargain with him over the substance of policies.

#### VETO

If a president disapproves of a bill passed by both houses of Congress, he may veto it in one of two ways. One is by a veto message. This is a statement that the president sends to Congress accompanying the bill, within 10 days (not counting Sundays) after the bill has been passed. In it he sets forth his reasons for not signing the bill. The other is the pocket veto. If the president does not sign the bill within 10 days and Congress has adjourned within that time, then the bill will not become law. Obviously, a pocket veto can be used only during a certain time of the year—just before Congress adjourns at the end of its second session. At times, however, presidents have pocket-vetoed a bill just before Congress recessed for a summer vacation or to permit its members to campaign during an off-year election. In 1972, Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts protested that this was unconstitutional, since a recess is not the same thing as an adjournment. In a case brought to federal court, Kennedy was upheld, and it is now understood that the pocket veto can be used only just before the life of a given Congress expires.

A bill not signed or vetoed within 10 days while Congress is still in session becomes law automatically, without the president’s approval. A bill returned to Congress with a veto message can be passed over the president’s objections if at least two-thirds of each house votes to override the veto. A bill that has received a pocket veto cannot be brought back to life by Congress (since Congress has adjourned), nor does such a bill carry over to the next session of Congress. If Congress wants to press the matter, it will have to start all over again by

### Table 14.2 Partisan Gains or Losses in Congress in Off-Year Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>House</th>
<th>Senate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>−70</td>
<td>−7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>−50</td>
<td>−8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Truman</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>−54</td>
<td>−11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rep.</td>
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<td>2010</td>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>Dem.</td>
<td>−64</td>
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**veto message** A message from the president to Congress stating that he will not sign a bill it has passed. Must be produced within 10 days of the bill’s passage.

**pocket veto** A bill fails to become law because the president did not sign it within 10 days before Congress adjourns.
passing the bill anew in its next session, and then hope the president will sign it or, if he does not, that they can override his veto.

The president must either accept or reject the entire bill. Presidents do not have the power, possessed by most governors, to exercise a **line-item veto**, with which the chief executive can approve some provisions of a bill and disapprove others. Congress could take advantage of this by putting items the president did not like into a bill he otherwise favored, forcing him to approve those provisions along with the rest of the bill or reject the whole thing. In 1996, Congress passed a bill, which the president signed into law, that gives the president the power of “enhanced rescission.” This means the president could cancel parts of a spending bill passed by Congress without vetoing the entire bill. The president had five days after signing a bill to send a message to Congress rescinding some parts of what he had signed. These rescissions would take effect unless Congress, by a two-thirds vote, overturned them. Congress could choose which parts of the president’s cancellations it wanted to overturn. But the Supreme Court has decided that this law is unconstitutional. The Constitution gives the president no such power to carve up a bill: he must either sign the whole bill, veto the whole bill, or allow it to become law without his signature.¹²

Nevertheless, the veto power is a substantial one, because Congress rarely has the votes to override it. From George Washington to Bill Clinton, more than 2,500 presidential vetoes were cast; about 4 percent were overridden (see Table 14.3). Cleveland, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower made the most extensive use of vetoes, accounting for 65 percent of all vetoes ever cast. George W. Bush did not veto a single bill in his first term, though he issued 12 vetoes in his second term, of which four were overridden. In his first two years in office, Barack Obama vetoed just two bills. Often the vetoed legislation is revised by Congress and passed in a form suitable to the president. There is no tally of how often this happens, but it is frequent enough so that both branches of government recognize that the veto, or even the threat of it, is part of an elaborate process of political negotiation in which the president has substantial powers.

**EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE**

The Constitution says nothing about whether the president is obliged to divulge private communications between himself and his principal advisers,
but presidents have acted as if they do have that privilege of confidentiality. The presidential claim is based on two grounds. First, the doctrine of the separation of powers means that one branch of government does not have the right to inquire into the internal workings of another branch headed by constitutionally named officers. Second, the principles of statecraft and of prudent administration require that the president have the right to obtain confidential and candid advice from subordinates; such advice could not be obtained if it would quickly be exposed to public scrutiny.

For almost 200 years, there was no serious challenge to the claim of presidential confidentiality. The Supreme Court did not require the disclosure of confidential communications to or from the president. Congress was never happy with this claim but until 1973 did not seriously dispute it. Indeed, in 1962, a Senate committee explicitly accepted a claim by President Kennedy that his secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara, was not obliged to divulge the identity of Defense Department officials who had censored certain speeches by generals and admirals.

In 1974, the Supreme Court for the first time met the issue directly. A federal special prosecutor sought tape recordings of White House conversations between President Nixon and his advisers as part of his investigation of the Watergate scandal. In the case of United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court, by a vote of eight to zero, held that while there may be a sound basis for the claim of executive privilege, especially where sensitive military or diplomatic matters are involved, there is no “absolute unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” To admit otherwise would be to block the constitutionally defined function of the federal courts to decide criminal cases.

Thus, Nixon was ordered to hand over the disputed tapes and papers to a federal judge so that the judge could decide which were relevant to the case at hand and allow those to be introduced into evidence. In the future, another president may well persuade the Court that a different set of records or papers is so sensitive as to require protection, especially if there is no allegation of criminal misconduct requiring the production of evidence in court. As a practical matter, it seems likely that presidential advisers will be able, except in unusual cases such as Watergate, to continue to give private advice to the president.

In 1997 and 1998, President Clinton was sued while in office by a private person, Paula Jones, who claimed he had solicited sex from her in ways that hurt her reputation. In defending himself against that and other matters, his lawyers attempted to claim executive privilege for Secret Service officers and government-paid lawyers who worked with him, but federal courts held that not only could a president be sued, but these other officials could not claim executive privilege. One unhappy consequence of this episode is that the courts have greatly weakened the number of officials with whom the president can speak in confidence. It is not easy to run an organization when the courts can later compel your associates to testify about everything you said.

**IMPOUNDMENT OF FUNDS**

From time to time, presidents have refused to spend money appropriated by Congress. Truman did not spend all that Congress wanted spent on the armed forces, and Johnson did not spend all that Congress made available for highway construction. Kennedy refused to spend money appropriated for new weapons systems that he did not like. Indeed, the precedent for impounding funds goes back at least to the administration of Thomas Jefferson.

But what has precedent is not thereby constitutional. The Constitution is silent on whether the president must spend the money that Congress appropriates; all it says is that the president cannot spend money that Congress has not appropriated. The major test of presidential power in this respect occurred during the Nixon administration. Nixon wished to reduce federal spending. He proposed in 1972 that Congress give him the power to reduce federal spending so that it would not exceed $250 billion for the coming year. Congress, under Democratic control, refused. Nixon responded by pocket-vetoing 12 spending bills and then impounding funds appropriated under other laws that he had not vetoed.

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**Landmark Cases**

**Powers of the President**

- **United States v. Nixon (1974):** Though the president is entitled to receive confidential advice, he can be required to reveal material related to a criminal prosecution.
- **Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982):** The president may not be sued while in office.
- **Clinton v. Jones (1997):** The president may be sued for actions taken before he became president.
Congress in turn responded by passing the Budget Reform Act of 1974, which, among other things, requires the president to spend all appropriated funds unless he first tells Congress what funds he wishes to spend and Congress, within 45 days, agrees to delete the items. If he wishes simply to delay spending the money, he need only inform Congress, but Congress then can refuse the delay by passing a resolution requiring the immediate release of the money. Federal courts have upheld the rule that the president must spend, without delay for policy reasons, money that Congress has appropriated.

SIGNING STATEMENTS

Since at least the presidency of James Monroe, the White House has issued statements at the time the president signs a bill that has been passed by Congress. These statements have had several purposes: to express presidential attitudes about the law, to tell the executive branch how to implement it, or to declare that the president thinks some part of the law is unconstitutional. President Andrew Jackson, for example, issued a statement in 1830 saying that a law designed to build a road from Chicago to Detroit should not cross the Michigan boundary (and so not get to Chicago). Congress complained, but Jackson’s view prevailed and the road did not get to Chicago.

In the 20th century, these statements became common. President Reagan issued 71, President George H. W. Bush signed 141, and President Clinton inked 105. By the late 1980s, they were published in legal documents as part of the legislative history of a bill. During his two terms, President George W. Bush signed more than 150, and in so doing, he challenged more than 1,200 sections of legislation, about double the number challenged by all of his predecessors. Between his inauguration and early 2011, President Obama (who campaigned against the use of signing statements) signed 14.17

Naturally, members of Congress are upset by this practice. To them, a signing statement often blocks the enforcement of a law Congress has passed and so it is equivalent to an unconstitutional line-item veto. But presidential advisers have defended these documents, arguing (as did an assistant attorney general in the Clinton administration) that they not only clarify how the law should be implemented but also allow the president to declare what part of the law is in his view unconstitutional and thus ought not to be enforced at all.18

While the Supreme Court has allowed signing statements to clarify the unclear legislative intent of a law, it has never given a clear verdict about the constitutional significance of such documents.19 By 2007, the Democratic Congress was considering a challenge to the practice, and President Barack Obama issued a memo less than three months after taking office stating that he would use signing statements only to protest unconstitutional provisions on legislation, not for policy disagreements. But even with unified government, President Obama issued a few signing statements during his first year in office, and members of Congress criticized him for doing so. The struggle over signing statements is another illustration of what one scholar has called the “invitation to struggle” that the Constitution has created between the president and Congress.20

Presidential Character

Although all presidents share certain constitutional and political powers, every president brings to the White House a distinctive personality; the way the White House is organized and run will reflect that personality. Moreover, the public will judge the president not only in terms of what he accomplishes, but also in terms of its perception of his character. Thus, personality plays a more important role in explaining the presidency than it does in explaining Congress.

Dwight Eisenhower brought an orderly, military style to the White House. He was accustomed to delegating authority and to having careful and complete staff work done for him by trained specialists. Though critics often accused him of having a bumbling, incoherent manner of speaking, in fact much of that was a public disguise—a strategy for avoiding being pinned down in public on matters where he wished to retain freedom of action. His private papers reveal a very different Eisenhower—sharp, precise, deliberate.

John Kennedy brought a very different style to the presidency. He projected the image of a bold, articulate, and amusing leader who liked to surround himself with talented amateurs. Instead of clear, hierarchical lines of authority, there was a pattern of personal rule and an atmosphere of improvisation. Kennedy did not hesitate to call very junior subordinates directly and tell them what to do, bypassing the chain of command.

Lyndon Johnson was a master legislative strategist who had risen to be majority leader of the Senate on the strength of his ability to persuade

signing statement

A presidential document that reveals what the president thinks of a new law and how it ought to be enforced.
other politicians in face-to-face encounters. He was a consummate deal maker who, having been in Washington for 30 years before becoming president, knew everybody and everything. As a result he tried to make every decision himself. But the style that served him well in political negotiations did not serve him well in speaking to the country at large, especially when trying to retain public support for the war in Vietnam.

Richard Nixon was a highly intelligent man with a deep knowledge of and interest in foreign policy, coupled with a deep suspicion of the media, his political rivals, and the federal bureaucracy. In contrast to Johnson, he disliked personal confrontations and tended to shield himself behind an elaborate staff system. distrustful of the cabinet agencies, he tried first to centralize power in the White House and then to put into key cabinet posts former White House aides loyal to him. Like Johnson, his personality made it difficult for him to mobilize popular support. Eventually, he was forced to resign under the threat of impeachment arising out of his role in the Watergate scandal.

Gerald Ford, before being appointed vice president, had spent his political life in Congress and was at home with the give-and-take, discussion-oriented procedures of that body. He was also a genial man who liked talking to people. Thus, he preferred the circular to the pyramid system of White House organization. But this meant that many decisions were made in a disorganized fashion in which key people—and sometimes key problems—were not taken into account.

Jimmy Carter was an outsider to Washington and boasted of it. A former Georgia governor, he was determined not to be “captured” by Washington insiders. He also was a voracious reader with a wide range of interests and an appetite for detail. These dispositions led him to try to do many things and to do them personally. Like Ford, he began with a circular structure; unlike Ford, he based his decisions on reading countless memos and asking detailed questions. His advisers finally decided that he was trying to do too much in too great detail, and toward the end of his term he shifted to a pyramid structure.

Ronald Reagan was also an outsider, a former governor of California. But unlike Carter, he wanted to set the broad directions of his administration and leave the details to others. He gave wide latitude to subordinates and to cabinet officers, within the framework of an emphasis on lower taxes, less domestic spending, a military buildup, and a tough line with the Soviet Union. He was a superb leader of public opinion, earning the nickname “The Great Communicator.”

George H. W. Bush lacked Reagan’s speaking skills and was much more of a hands-on manager. Drawing on his extensive experience in the federal government (he had been vice president, director of the CIA, ambassador to the United Nations, representative to China, and a member of the House), Bush made decisions on the basis of personal contacts with key foreign leaders and Washington officials.

Bill Clinton, like Carter, paid a lot of attention to public policy and preferred informal, ad hoc arrangements for running his office. Unlike Carter, he was an effective speaker who could make almost any idea sound plausible. He was elected as a centrist Democrat but immediately pursued liberal policies such as comprehensive health insurance. When those failed and the Republicans won control of Congress in 1994, Clinton became a centrist again. His sexual affairs became the object of major investigations, and he was impeached by the House but acquitted by the Senate.

George W. Bush, the 43rd president, entered office as an outsider from Texas, but he was an outsider with a difference: his father had served as the 41st president of the United States, his late paternal grandfather had served as a U.S. senator from Connecticut, and he won the presidency only after the U.S. Supreme Court halted a recount of ballots in Florida, where his brother was governor. During the campaign, he focused almost entirely on domestic issues, especially cutting taxes and reforming education. A deeply religious man, he talked openly about how he had stopped excessive drinking only after he had found God. He ran as a “compassionate conservative” concerned about America’s needy children and families. Bush, who had earned an advanced degree in business administration from Harvard, ran a very tight White House ship, insisting that meetings run on time and that press contacts be strictly controlled. He turned back public doubts about his intellect through self-deprecating humor. Following the terrorist attack on America on September 11, 2001, his agenda shifted almost entirely to foreign and military affairs, the war on terror, and the issue of homeland security.

Barack Obama succeeded Bush in 2009. He was the first African American to win a major party’s presidential nomination and only the third person elected to the presidency while a sitting U.S. Senator. After Harvard, he taught constitutional law part-time at the University of Chicago. After entering politics and winning an Illinois State
Senate seat, he was elected to the U.S. Senate in 2004. His electrifying speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention catapulted him to national attention. He criticized Democratic presidential candidates who had supported military action against Iraq, and he campaigned in 2008 as the candidate of change and hope (“Yes we can!” was his most popular mantra). He came to office in January 2009 amid a global economic crisis that included devastating losses in America’s real-estate sector and financial markets. In his first two years in office, he passed the largest budget in U.S. history and enacted legislation for comprehensive health insurance.

The Office of the President

It was not until 1857 that the president was allowed to have a private secretary paid for with public funds, and it was not until after the assassination of President McKinley in 1901 that the president was given a Secret Service bodyguard. The president was not able to submit a single presidential budget until after 1921, when the Budget and Accounting Act was passed and the Bureau of the Budget (now called the Office of Management and Budget) was created. Grover Cleveland personally answered the White House telephone, and Abraham Lincoln often answered his own mail.

Today, of course, the president has hundreds of people assisting him, and the trappings of power—helicopters, guards, limousines—are plainly visible. The White House staff has grown enormously. (Just how big the staff is, no one knows. Presidents like to pretend that the White House is not the large bureaucracy that it in fact has become.) Add to this the opportunities for presidential appointments to the cabinet, the courts, and various agencies, and the resources at the disposal of the president would appear to be awesome. That conclusion is partly true and partly false, or at least misleading, and for a simple reason. If the president was once helpless for lack of assistance, he now confronts an army of assistants so large that it constitutes a bureaucracy he has difficulty controlling.

The ability of a presidential assistant to affect the president is governed by the rule of propinquity: in general, power is wielded by people in the room when a decision is made. Presidential appointments can thus be classified in terms of their proximity, physical and political, to the president. There are three degrees of propinquity: the White House Office, the Executive Office, and the cabinet.

The White House Office

The president’s closest assistants have offices in the White House, usually in the West Wing of that building. Their titles often do not reveal the functions that they actually perform: “counsel,” “counselor,” “assistant to the president,” “special assistant,” “special consultant,” and so forth. The actual titles vary from one administration to another, but in general the men and women who hold them oversee the political and policy interests of the president. As part of the president’s personal staff, these aides do not have to be confirmed by the Senate; the president can hire and fire them at will. In 2001, the Bush White House had 400 staff members and a budget of $35.4 million.

There are essentially three ways in which a president can organize his personal staff—through the “pyramid,” “circular,” and “ad hoc” methods. In a pyramid structure, used by Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and (after a while) Clinton, most assistants report through a hierarchy to a chief of staff, who then deals directly with the president. In a circular structure, used by Carter, cabinet secretaries and assistants report directly to the president. In an ad hoc structure, used for a while by President Clinton, task forces, committees, and informal groups of friends and advisers deal directly with the president. For example, the Clinton administration’s health care policy planning was spearheaded not by Health and Human Services secretary Donna E. Shalala, but by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and a White House adviser, Ira Magaziner. Likewise, its initiative to reform the federal bureaucracy (the National Performance Review) was led not by Office of Management and Budget director Leon E. Panetta, but by an adviser to Vice President Gore, Elaine Kamarck.21

It is common for presidents to mix methods. For example, Franklin Roosevelt alternated between the circular and ad hoc methods in the conduct of his domestic policy and sometimes employed a pyramid structure when dealing with foreign affairs and military policy.

Taken individually, each method of organization has advantages and disadvantages. A pyramid structure provides for an orderly flow of information and
decisions, but does so at the risk of isolating or misinforming the president. The circular method has the virtue of giving the president a great deal of information, but at the price of confusion and conflict among cabinet secretaries and assistants. An ad hoc structure allows great flexibility, minimizes bureaucratic inertia, and generates ideas and information from disparate channels, but it risks cutting the president off from the government officials who are ultimately responsible for translating presidential decisions into policy proposals and administrative action.

All presidents claim they are open to many sources of advice, and some presidents try to guarantee that openness by using the circular method of staff organization. President Carter liked to describe his office as a wheel with himself as the hub and his several assistants as spokes. But most presidents discover, as did Carter, that the difficulty of managing the large White House bureaucracy and of conserving their own limited supply of time and energy makes it necessary for them to rely heavily on one or two key subordinates.

Carter, in July 1979, dramatically altered the White House staff organization by elevating Hamilton Jordan to the post of chief of staff, with the job of coordinating the work of the other staff assistants.

At first, President Reagan adopted a compromise between the circle and the pyramid, putting the White House under the direction of three key aides. At the beginning of his second term in 1985, however, the president shifted to a pyramid, placing all his assistants under a single chief of staff. Clinton began with an ad hoc system and then changed to one more like a pyramid. Each assistant has, of course, others working for him or her, sometimes a large number. There are, at a slightly lower level of status, “special assistants to the president” for various purposes. (Being “special” means, paradoxically, being less important.)

Typically, senior White House staff members are drawn from the ranks of the president’s campaign staff—longtime associates in whom he has

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**How Things Work**

**The Myth and Reality of the White House Office**

**The Myth**

The White House Office was created in the 1930s following recommendations made by the President’s Commission on Administrative Management. The principles underlying those recommendations have been endorsed by almost every presidential chief of staff since then. The key ones are:

1. **Small is beautiful.** The presidential staff should be small. At first, there were only six assistants.
2. **A passion for anonymity.** The president’s personal assistants should stay out of the limelight.
3. **Honest brokers.** The presidential staff should not make decisions for the president; it should only coordinate the flow of information to the president.

**The Reality**

Increasingly, the operations of the White House Office seem to reflect almost the exact opposite of these principles.

1. **Big is better.** The White House staff has grown enormously in size. Hundreds now work there.
2. **Get out front.** Key White House staffers have become household words—Henry Kissinger (under Nixon and Ford), H. R. Haldeman (under Nixon), Hamilton Jordan (under Carter), Howard Baker (under Reagan), George Stephanopoulos (under Clinton), and Karl Rove (under G. W. Bush).

3. **Be in charge.** Cabinet officers regularly complain that White House staffers are shutting them out and making all the important decisions. Congressional investigations have revealed the power of such White House aides as Haldeman, John Poindexter, and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North.

**Why the Gap Between Myth and Reality?**

The answer is—the people and the government. The people expect much more from presidents today; no president can afford to say, “We’re too busy here to worry about that.” The government is much more complex, and so leadership requires more resources. Even conservatives such as Ronald Reagan have been activist presidents.

confidence. A few members, however, will be experts brought in after the campaign: such was the case, for example, with Henry Kissinger, a former Harvard professor who became President Nixon's assistant for national security affairs. The offices these men and women occupy often are small and crowded (Kissinger’s was not much bigger than the one he had while a professor at Harvard), but their occupants willingly put up with any discomfort in exchange for the privilege (and the power) of being in the White House. The arrangement of offices—their size, and especially their proximity to the president’s Oval Office—is a good measure of the relative influence of the people in them.

To an outsider, the amount of jockeying among the top staff for access to the president may seem comical or even perverse. The staff attaches enormous significance to whose office is closest to the president’s, who can see him on a daily as opposed to a weekly basis, who can get an appointment with the president and who cannot, and who has a right to see documents and memoranda just before they go to the Oval Office. To be sure, there is ample grist here for Washington political novels. But there is also something important at stake: it is not simply a question of power plays and ego trips. Who can see the president and who sees and “signs off” on memora going to the president affect in important ways who influences policy and thus whose goals and beliefs become embedded in policy.

For example, if a memo from a secretary of the treasury who believes in free trade can go directly to the president, the president may be more likely to support free trade (low tariffs). On the other hand, if that memo must be routed through the office of the assistant to the president for political affairs, who is worried about the adverse effects of foreign competition on jobs in the American steel industry because the votes of steelworkers are important to the president’s reelection campaign, then the president may be led to support higher tariffs.

THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Agencies in the Executive Office report directly to the president and perform staff services for him but are not located in the White House itself. Their members may or may not enjoy intimate contact with him; some agencies are rather large bureaucracies. The top positions in these organizations are filled by presidential appointment, but unlike the White House staff positions, these appointments must be confirmed by the Senate.

The principal agencies in the Executive Office are:
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
- Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
- Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
- Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
- Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Of all the agencies in the Executive Office of the President, perhaps the most important in terms of the president’s need for assistance in administering the federal government is the Office of Management and Budget. First called the Bureau of the Budget when it was created in 1921, it became OMB in 1970 to reflect its broader responsibilities. Today it does considerably more than assemble and analyze the figures that go each year into the national budget the president submits to Congress. It also studies the organization and operations of the executive branch, devises plans for reorganizing various departments and agencies, develops ways of getting better information about government programs, and reviews proposals that cabinet departments want included in the president’s legislative program.

The OMB has a staff of more than 500 people, almost all career civil servants, many of high professional skill and substantial experience. Traditionally, OMB has been a nonpartisan agency—experts serving all presidents, without regard to party or ideology. Starting with the Reagan administration, however, OMB has played a major role in advocating policies rather than merely analyzing them. David Stockman, President Reagan’s OMB director, was the primary architect of the 1981 and 1985 budget cuts proposed by the president and enacted by Congress. Stockman’s proposals often were adopted over the objections of the affected department heads. In 2001, President George W. Bush’s OMB director, Mitch Daniels, also participated fully in West Wing political strategy sessions; he later was elected governor of Indiana. In 2009, President Obama appointed Peter Orzag, a former think-tank and university researcher who had served as an economic adviser to President Clinton and as a budget analyst in Congress, to head OMB. Whether Orzag’s appointment presaged a return to OMB’s earlier tradition as a mostly nonpartisan body remains to be seen.

THE CABINET

The cabinet is a product of tradition and hope. At one time, the heads of the federal departments met regularly with the president to discuss matters,
and some people, especially those critical of strong presidents, would like to see this kind of collegial decision making reestablished. But in fact this role of the cabinet is largely a fiction. Indeed, the Constitution does not even mention the cabinet (though the Twenty-fifth Amendment implicitly defines it as consisting of “the principal offices of the executive departments”). When Washington tried to get his cabinet members to work together, its two strongest members—Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson—spent most of their time feuding. The cabinet, as a presidential committee, did not work any better for John Adams or Abraham Lincoln, for Franklin Roosevelt or John Kennedy. Dwight Eisenhower is almost the only modern president who came close to making the cabinet a truly deliberative body: he gave it a large staff, held regular meetings, and listened to opinions expressed there. But even under Eisenhower, the cabinet did not have much influence over presidential decisions, nor did it help him gain more power over the government.

By custom, cabinet officers are the heads of the 15 major executive departments. These departments, together with the dates of their creation and the approximate number of their employees, are given in Table 14.4. The order of their creation is unimportant except in terms of protocol: where one sits at cabinet meetings is determined by the age of the department that one heads. Thus, the secretary of state sits next to the president on one side and the secretary of the treasury next to him on the other. Down at the foot of the table are the heads of the newer departments.

The president appoints or directly controls vastly more members of his cabinet departments than does the British prime minister. The reason is simple: the president must struggle with Congress for control of these agencies, while the prime minister has no rival branch of government that seeks this power. Presidents get more appointments than prime ministers to make up for what the separation of powers denies them.

This abundance of political appointments, however, does not give the president ample power over the departments. The secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) reports to the president and has a few hundred political appointees to assist him or her in responding to the president’s wishes. But the secretary of HHS heads an agency with more than 60,000 employees, 11 operating divisions, hundreds of grant-making programs, and a budget of more than $460 billion. Likewise, the secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spends most of his or her time on departmental business and vastly less on talking to the president. It is hardly surprising that the secretary is largely a representative of HUD to the president than his representative to HUD. And no one should be surprised that the secretary of HUD rarely finds much to talk about with the secretary of defense at cabinet meetings.

Having the power to make these appointments does give the president one great advantage: he has a lot of opportunities to reward friends and political supporters. In the Education Department, for example, President Clinton found jobs for onetime mayors, senators, state legislators, and campaign aides.

### Table 14.4 The Cabinet Departments

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<tr>
<td>Agriculture(^b)</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>97,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>74,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>1913</td>
<td>16,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Human Services(^c)</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>65,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing and Urban Development</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>9,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>56,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>15,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>4,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>289,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>177,428</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Formerly the War Department, created in 1789. Figures are for civilians only.

\(^b\)Agriculture Department created in 1862; made part of cabinet in 1889.


or her time on departmental business and vastly less on talking to the president. It is hardly surprising that the secretary is largely a representative of HUD to the president than his representative to HUD. And no one should be surprised that the secretary of HUD rarely finds much to talk about with the secretary of defense at cabinet meetings.

Having the power to make these appointments does give the president one great advantage: he has a lot of opportunities to reward friends and political supporters. In the Education Department, for example, President Clinton found jobs for onetime mayors, senators, state legislators, and campaign aides.

### INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND JUDGESHIPS

The president also appoints people to four dozen or so agencies and commissions that are not considered part of the cabinet and that by law often have a quasi-independent status. The difference between an “executive” and an “independent” agency is not
precise. In general, it means the heads of executive agencies serve at the pleasure of the president and can be removed at his discretion. On the other hand, the heads of many independent agencies serve for fixed terms of office and can be removed only "for cause" (see box on page 393).

The president can also appoint federal judges, subject to the consent of the Senate. Judges serve for life unless they are removed by impeachment and conviction. The reason for the special barriers to the removal of judges is that they represent an independent branch of government as defined by the Constitution, and limits on presidential removal powers are necessary to preserve that independence.

One new feature of appointing top government officials is the increasing use of "acting" appointments. An acting appointee holds office until the Senate acts on his or her nomination. In 1998, acting officials held one-fifth of all of the Clinton administration’s cabinet-level (or subcabinet-level)* jobs. Some were in office for many months. Many senators feel that this violates their right to consent to appointments and in particular violates the Vacancies Act passed in 1868. That law limits acting appointees to 120 days in office. If the Senate takes no action during those 120 days, the acting official may stay in office until he or she, or someone else, is confirmed for the post. Administration officials defend the practice as necessary given the slow pace of confirmations; senators attack it as an opportunity for a president to fill up his administration with unconfirmed officials.

Who Gets Appointed

As we have seen, a president can make a lot of appointments, but he rarely knows more than a few of the people whom he does appoint.

Unlike cabinet members in a parliamentary system, the president’s cabinet officers and their principal deputies usually have not served with the chief executive in the legislature. Instead they come from private business, universities, think tanks, foundations, law firms, labor unions, and the ranks of former and present members of Congress as well as past state and local government officials. A president is fortunate if most cabinet members turn out to agree with him on major policy questions. President Reagan made a special effort to ensure that his cabinet members were ideologically in tune with him, but even so Secretary of State Alexander

Haig soon got into a series of quarrels with senior members of the White House staff and had to resign.

The men and women appointed to the cabinet and to the subcabinet usually will have had some prior federal experience. One study of more than a thousand such appointments made by five presidents (Franklin Roosevelt through Lyndon Johnson) found that about 85 percent of the cabinet, subcabinet, and independent-agency appointees had some prior federal experience. In fact, most were in government service (at the federal, state, or local levels) just before they received their cabinet or subcabinet appointment. Clearly, the executive branch is not, in general, run by novices.

Many of these appointees are what Richard Neustadt has called "in-and-outers": people who alternate between jobs in the federal government and ones in the private sector, especially in law firms and in universities. Donald Rumsfeld, before becoming secretary of defense to President George W. Bush, had been secretary of defense and chief of staff under President Ford and before that a member of Congress. Between his Ford and Bush services, he was an executive in a large pharmaceutical company. This pattern is quite different from that of parliamentary systems, where all the cabinet officers come from the legislature and typically are full-time career politicians.

At one time, the cabinet had in it many people with strong political followings of their own—former senators and governors and powerful local party leaders. Under Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy, the postmaster general was the president’s campaign manager. George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and other presidents had to contend with cabinet members who were powerful figures in their own right: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson worked with Washington; Simon Cameron (a Pennsylvania political boss) and Salmon P. Chase (formerly governor of Ohio) worked for—and against—Lincoln. Before 1824, the post of secretary of state was regarded as a stepping stone to the presidency; and after that at least 10 persons ran for president who had been either secretary of state or ambassador to a foreign country. Of late, however, a tendency has developed for presidents to place in their cabinets people known for their expertise or administrative experience rather than for their political following. This is in part because political parties are now so weak that party leaders can no longer demand a place in the cabinet and in part because presidents want (or think they want) “experts.” A remarkable illustration of this is the number of people with Ph.Ds who have entered

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*Subcabinet refers to undersecretary, deputy secretary, and assistant secretaries in each cabinet department.
the cabinet. President Nixon, who supposedly did not like Harvard professors, appointed two—Henry Kissinger and Daniel Patrick Moynihan—to important posts; Gerald Ford added a third, John Dunlop.

A president’s desire to appoint experts who do not have independent political power is modified—but not supplanted—by his need to recognize various politically important groups, regions, and organizations. Since Robert Weaver became the first African American to serve in the cabinet (as secretary of HUD under President Johnson), it is clear that it would be quite costly for a president not to have one or more blacks in his cabinet. The secretary of labor must be acceptable to the AFL-CIO, the secretary of agriculture to at least some organized farmers. Each of the last three presidents (Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama) appointed several women and minorities to his cabinet.

Because political considerations must be taken into account in making cabinet and agency appointments and because any head of a large organization will tend to adopt the perspective of that organization, there is an inevitable tension—even a rivalry—between the White House staff and the department heads. Staff members see themselves as extensions of the president’s personality and policies; department heads see themselves as repositories of expert knowledge (often knowledge of why something will not work as the president hopes). White House staffers, many of them young men and women in their 20s or early 30s with little executive experience, will call department heads, often persons in their 50s with substantial executive experience, and tell them “the president wants” this or that or “the president asked me to tell you” one thing or another. Department heads try to conceal their irritation and then maneuver for some delay so they can develop their own counterproposals. On the other hand, when department heads call a White House staff person and ask to see the president, unless they are one of the privileged few in whom the president has special confidence, they often are told that “the president can’t be bothered with that” or “the president doesn’t have time to see you.”

### How Things Work

#### Federal Agencies

The following agencies are classified by whether the president has unlimited or limited right of removal.

**“Executive” Agencies**

Head can be removed at any time.

- Action
- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Commission on Civil Rights
- Energy Research and Development Agency
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
- General Services Administration
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Postal Service
- Small Business Administration
- All cabinet departments
- Executive Office of the President

**“Independent” or “Quasi-Independent” Agencies**

Members serve for a fixed term.

- Federal Reserve Board (14 years)
- Consumer Product Safety Commission (6 years)
- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (5 years)
- Federal Communications Commission (7 years)
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (6 years)
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (5 years)
- Federal Maritime Commission (5 years)
- Federal Trade Commission (7 years)
- Federal Maritime Commission (5 years)
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (5 years)
- National Labor Relations Board (5 years)
- National Science Foundation (6 years)
- Securities and Exchange Commission (5 years)
- Tennessee Valley Authority (9 years)
The President’s Program

Imagine you have just spent three or four years running for president, during which time you have given essentially the same speech over and over again. You have had no time to study the issues in any depth. To reach a large television audience, you have couched your ideas largely in rather simple—if not simple-minded—slogans. Your principal advisers are political aides, not legislative specialists.

You win. You are inaugurated. Now you must be a president instead of just talking about it. You must fill hundreds of appointive posts, but you know personally only a handful of the candidates. You must deliver a State of the Union message to Congress only two or three weeks after you are sworn in. It is quite possible you have never read, much less written, such a message before. You must submit a new budget; the old one is hundreds of pages long, much of it comprehensible only to experts. Foreign governments, as well as the stock market, hang on your every word, interpreting many of your remarks in ways that totally surprise you. What will you do?

The Constitution is not much help. It directs you to report on the state of the union and to recommend “such measures” as you shall judge “necessary and expedient.” Beyond that, you are charged to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

At one time, of course, the demands placed on a newly elected president were not very great, because the president was not expected to do very much. The president, on assuming office, might speak of the tariff, or relations with England, or the value of veterans’ pensions, or the need for civil service reform, but he was not expected to have something to say (and offer) to everybody. Today he is.

PUTTING TOGETHER A PROGRAM

To develop policies on short notice, a president will draw on several sources, each with particular strengths and weaknesses:

- **Interest groups**
  
  *Strength:* Will have specific plans and ideas.
  
  *Weakness:* Will have narrow view of the public interest.

- **Aides and campaign advisers**
  
  *Strength:* Will test new ideas for their political soundness.
  
  *Weakness:* Will not have many ideas to test; inexperienced in government.

- **Federal bureaus and agencies**
  
  *Strength:* Will know what is feasible in terms of governmental realities.
  
  *Weakness:* Will propose plans that promote own agencies and will not have good information on whether plans will work.
Outside, academic, and other specialists and experts

Strength: Will have many general ideas and criticisms of existing programs.
Weakness: Will not know the details of policy or have good judgment as to what is feasible.

There are essentially two ways for a president to develop a program. One, exemplified by Presidents Carter and Clinton, is to have a policy on almost everything. To do this, they worked endless hours and studied countless documents, trying to learn something about and then state their positions on, a large number of issues. The other method, illustrated by President Reagan, is to concentrate on three or four major initiatives or themes and leave everything else to subordinates.

But even when a president has a governing philosophy, as did Reagan, he cannot risk plunging ahead on his own. He must judge public and congressional reaction to this program before he commits himself fully to it. Therefore, he often will allow parts of his program to be “leaked” to the press, or “floated” as a trial balloon. Reagan’s commitment to a 30 percent tax cut and larger military expenditures was so well known that it required no leaking, but he did have to float his ideas on Social Security and certain budget cuts to test popular reaction. His opponents in the bureaucracy did exactly the same thing, hoping for the opposite effect. They leaked controversial parts of the program in an effort to discredit the whole policy. This process of testing the winds by a president and his critics helps explain why so many news stories coming from Washington mention no person by name but only an anonymous “highly placed source.”

In addition to the risks of adverse reaction, the president faces three other constraints on his ability to plan a program. One is the sheer limit of his time and attention span. Every president works harder than he has ever worked before. A 90-hour week is typical. Even so, he has great difficulty keeping up with all the things he is supposed to know and make decisions about. For example, Congress during an average year passes between 400 and 600 bills, each of which the president must sign, veto, or allow to take effect without his signature. Scores of people wish to see him. Hundreds of phone calls must be made to members of Congress and others in order to ask for help, to smooth ruffled feathers, or to get information. He must receive all newly appointed ambassadors and visiting heads of state and in addition have his picture taken with countless people, from a Nobel Prize winner to a child whose likeness will appear on the Easter Seal.

The second constraint is the unexpected crisis. Franklin Roosevelt obviously had to respond to a depression and to the mounting risks of world war. But most presidents get their crises when they least expect them. Consider these crises:

Kennedy
- Failure of Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba
- Soviets put missiles in Cuba
- China invades India
- Federal troops sent to the South to protect blacks

Johnson
- Vietnam War
- Black riots in major cities
- War between India and Pakistan
- Civil war in Dominican Republic
- Arab-Israeli war
- Civil rights workers murdered in South

Nixon
- Watergate scandal
- Arab-Israeli war
- Value of dollar falls in foreign trade
- Arabs raise the price of oil

Carter
- OMB director Bert Lance accused of improprieties
- Lengthy coal strike
- Seizure of American hostages in Iran
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

Reagan
- Poland suppresses Solidarity movement
- U.S. troops sent to Lebanon
- U.S. hostages held in Lebanon
- Civil war in Nicaragua
- Iran-Contra crisis

George H.W. Bush
- Soviet Union dissolves
- Iraq invades Kuwait

Clinton
- Civil war continues in Bosnia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia
Investigation of possible wrongdoing of President and Mrs. Clinton in Whitewater real estate development

Clinton impeached

George W. Bush

Terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon kill close to 3,000 people

U.S.-led wars against terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq

Obama

Economic crisis affecting financial markets, industry, and employment

The third constraint is that the federal government and most federal programs, as well as the federal budget, can only be changed marginally, except in special circumstances. The vast bulk of federal expenditures are beyond control in any given year: the money must be spent whether the president likes it or not. Many federal programs have such strong congressional or public support that they must be left intact or modified only slightly. And this means that most federal employees can count on being secure in their jobs, whatever a president’s views on reducing the bureaucracy.

The result of these constraints is that the president, at least in ordinary times, has to be selective about what he wants. He can be thought of as having a stock of influence and prestige the way that he might have a supply of money. If he wants to get the most “return” on his resources, he must “invest” that influence and prestige carefully in enterprises that promise substantial gains—in public benefits and political support—at reasonable costs. Each president tends to speak in terms of changing everything at once, calling his approach a “New Deal,” a “New Frontier,” a “Great Society,” or the “New Federalism.” But beneath the rhetoric, he must identify a few specific proposals on which he wishes to bet his resources, mindful of the need to leave a substantial stock of resources in reserve to handle the inevitable crises and emergencies. In recent decades, events have required every president to devote much of his time and resources to two key issues: the state of the economy and foreign affairs. What he manages to do beyond this will depend on his personal views and his sense of what the nation, as well as his reelection, requires.

And it will depend on one other thing: opinion polls. The last president who never used polls was Herbert Hoover. Franklin Roosevelt began making heavy use of them, and every president since has relied on them. Bill Clinton had voters polled about almost everything—where he should go on vacation (the West) and how to deal with Bosnia (no ground troops).

Once, when polls did not exist, politicians often believed they should do what they thought the public interest required. Now that polls are commonplace, some politicians act on the basis of what their constituents want. Scholars call the first view the trustee approach: do what the public good requires, even if the voters are skeptical. The second view is the delegate model: do what your constituents want you to do.

But there is another way of looking at polls. They may be a device not for picking a policy, but for deciding what language to use in explaining that policy. Choose a policy that helps you get reelected or that satisfies an interest group, but then explain it with poll-tested words. President Clinton wanted to keep affirmative action (described in the chapter titled “Civil Rights”), but knew that most voters disliked it. So he used a poll-tested phrase—“mend it but don’t end it”—and then did nothing to mend it.

Finally, a president’s program can be radically altered by a dramatic event or prolonged crisis. George W. Bush ran as a candidate interested in domestic issues and with little background in foreign affairs, but the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon dramatically changed his presidency into one preoccupied with foreign and military policy. Barack Obama campaigned against the war in Iraq but spent the first months of his presidency focused mainly on the country’s sagging economy.
ATTEMPTS TO REORGANIZE

One item on the presidential agenda has been the same for almost every president since Herbert Hoover: reorganizing the executive branch of government. In the wake of the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the president, by executive order, created a new White House Office of Homeland Security, headed by his friend and former Pennsylvania governor, Tom Ridge. In the months that followed, it became clear to all, including the president, that he had given Ridge an impossible job. For one thing, despite its obvious importance, Ridge’s office, like most units with the Executive Office of the President, had only a dozen or so full-time staff, little budgetary authority, and virtually no ability to make and enforce decisions regarding how cabinet agencies operated. Nobody could meaningfully coordinate the literally dozens of administrative units that the administration’s new homeland security blueprint required Ridge’s office to somehow manage.

To address this problem, President Bush called for a reorganization that would create the third-largest cabinet department encompassing 22 federal agencies, nearly 180,000 employees, and an annual budget of close to $40 billion. Among the federal agencies placed under the new Department of Homeland Security are the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A law authorizing the new Department of Homeland Security was enacted in November 2002, but it will take years and much effort for the new agency to become fully operational.

Important as it is, the ongoing attempt to reorganize the federal government around homeland security goals is neither the first, nor even the largest, reorganization effort made by a sitting president. With few exceptions, every president since 1928 has tried to change the structure of the staff, departments, and agencies that are theoretically subordinate to him. Every president has been appalled by the number of agencies that report to him and by the apparently helter-skelter manner in which they have grown up. But this is only one—and often not the most important—reason for wanting to reorganize. If a president wants to get something done, put new people in charge of a program, or recapture political support for a policy, it often is easier to do so by creating a new agency or reorganizing an old one than by abolishing a program, firing a subordinate, or passing a new law. Reorganization serves many objectives and thus is a recurring theme.

Legally, the president can reorganize his personal White House staff anytime he wishes. To reorganize in any important way the larger Executive Office of the President or any of the executive departments or agencies, however, Congress must first be consulted. For more than 40 years, this consultation usually took the form of submitting to Congress a reorganization plan that would take effect provided that neither the House nor the Senate passed, within 60 days, a concurrent resolution disapproving the plan (such a resolution was called a legislative veto). This procedure, first authorized by the Reorganization Act of 1939, could be used to change, but not create or abolish, an executive agency. In 1981, authority under that act expired, and Congress did not renew it. Two years later, the Supreme Court declared all legislative vetoes unconstitutional (see Chapter 15), and so today any presidential reorganization plan would have to take the form of a regular law, passed by Congress and signed by the president.

What has been said so far may well give the reader the impression that the president is virtually helpless. That is not the case. The actual power of the president can only be measured in terms of what he can accomplish. What this chapter has described so far is the office as the president finds it—the burdens, restraints, demands, complexities, and resources that he encounters on entering the Oval Office for the first time. Every president since Truman has commented feelingly on how limited the powers of the president seem from the inside compared to what they appear to be from the outside. Franklin Roosevelt compared his struggles with the bureaucracy to punching a feather bed; Truman wrote that the power of the president was chiefly the power to persuade people to do what they ought to do anyway. After in office a year or so, Kennedy spoke to interviewers about how much more complex the world appeared than he had first supposed. Johnson and Nixon were broken by the office and the events that happened there.

Yet Franklin Roosevelt helped create the modern presidency, with its vast organizational reach, and directed a massive war effort. Truman ordered two atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities. Eisenhower sent American troops to Lebanon; Kennedy supported an effort to invade Cuba. Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic and to Vietnam; Nixon ordered an invasion of Cambodia;
Reagan launched an invasion of Grenada and sponsored an antigovernment insurgent group in Nicaragua; Bush invaded Panama and sent troops to the Persian Gulf to fight Iraq; Clinton sent troops to Haiti and Bosnia; George W. Bush ordered U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq; Barack Obama approved air strikes in Libya. Obviously Europeans, Russians, Vietnamese, Panamanians, Iraqis, and others do not think the American president is “helpless.”

Presidential Transition

No president but Franklin Roosevelt has ever served more than two terms, and since the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment in 1951, no president will ever again have the chance. But more than tradition or the Constitution escorts presidents from office. Only about one-third of the presidents since George Washington have been elected to a second term. Of the 27 not reelected, four died in office during their first term. But the remainder either did not seek or (more usually) could not obtain reelection.

Of the eight presidents who died in office, four were assassinated: Lincoln, Garfield, McKinley, and Kennedy. At least six other presidents were the objects of unsuccessful assassination attempts: Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Ford, and Reagan. (There may have been attempts on other presidents that never came to public notice; the attempts mentioned here involved public efforts to fire weapons at presidents.)

The presidents who served two or more terms fall into certain periods, such as the Founding (Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe) or wartime (Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt), or they happened to be in office during especially tranquil times (Monroe, McKinley, Eisenhower, Clinton), or some combination of the above. When the country was deeply divided, as during the years just before the Civil War and during the period of Reconstruction after it, it was the rare president who was reelected.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Eight times a vice president has become president because of the death of his predecessor. It first happened to John Tyler, who became president in 1841 when William Henry Harrison died peacefully after only one month in office. The question for Tyler and for the country was substantial: was Tyler simply to be the acting president and a kind of caretaker until a new president was elected, or was he to be president in every sense of the word? Despite criticism and despite what might have been the contrary intention of the Framers of the Constitution, Tyler decided on the latter course and was confirmed in that opinion by a decision of Congress. Ever since, the vice president has automatically become president, in title and in powers, when the occupant of the White House has died or resigned.

But if vice presidents frequently acquire office because of death, they rarely acquire it by election. Since the earliest period of the Founding, when John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were each elected president after having first served as vice president under their predecessors, there have only been three occasions when a vice president was later able to win the presidency without his president’s having died in office. One was in 1836, when Martin Van Buren was elected president after having served as Andrew Jackson’s vice president; the second was in 1968, when Richard Nixon became president after having served as Dwight Eisenhower’s vice president eight years earlier; the third was in 1988, when George Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan. Many vice presidents who entered the Oval Office because their predecessors died were subsequently elected to terms in their own right—Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, and Lyndon Johnson. But no one who wishes to become president should assume that to become vice president first is the best way to get there.
The vice-presidency is just what so many vice presidents have complained about its being: a rather empty job. John Adams described it as “the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived,” and most of his successors would have agreed. Thomas Jefferson, almost alone, had a good word to say for it: “The second office of the government is honorable and easy, the first is but a splendid misery.” Daniel Webster rejected a vice-presidential nomination in 1848 with the phrase, “I do not choose to be buried until I am really dead.” (Had he taken the job, he would have become president after Zachary Taylor died in office, thereby achieving a remarkable secular resurrection.) For all the good and bad jokes about the vice-presidency, however, candidates still struggle mightily for it. John Nance Garner gave up the speakership of the House to become Franklin Roosevelt’s vice president (a job he valued as “not worth a pitcher of warm spit”), and Lyndon Johnson gave up the majority leadership of the Senate to become Kennedy’s. Truman, Nixon, Humphrey, Mondale, and Gore all left reasonably secure Senate seats for the vice-presidency.

The only official task of the vice president is to preside over the Senate and to vote in case of a tie. Even this is scarcely time-consuming, as the Senate chooses from among its members a president pro tempore, as required by the Constitution, who (along with others) presides in the absence of the vice president. The vice president’s leadership powers in the Senate are weak, especially when the vice president is of a different party from the majority of the senators. But on occasion the vice president can become very important. Right after the terrorists attacked the United States in 2001, President Bush was in his airplane while his advisers worried that he might be attacked next. Vice President Cheney was quickly hidden away in a secret, secure location so he could run the government if anything happened to President Bush. And for many months thereafter, Cheney stayed in this location in case he suddenly became president. But absent a crisis, the vice president is, at best, only an adviser to the president.

PROBLEMS OF SUCCESSION

If the president should die in office, the right of the vice president to assume that office has been clear since the time of John Tyler. But two questions remain: What if the president falls seriously ill, but does not die? And if the vice president steps up, who then becomes the new vice president?

The first problem has arisen on a number of occasions. After President James A. Garfield was shot in 1881, he lingered through the summer before he died. President Woodrow Wilson collapsed from a stroke and was a virtual recluse for seven months in 1919 and an invalid for the rest of his term. Eisenhower had three serious illnesses while in office; Reagan was shot during his first term and hospitalized during his second.

The second problem has arisen on eight occasions when the vice president became president owing to the death of the incumbent. In these cases, no elected person was available to succeed the new president, should he die in office. For many decades, the problem was handled by law. The Succession Act of 1886, for example, designated the secretary of state as next in line for the presidency should the vice president die, followed by the other cabinet officers in order of seniority. But this meant that a vice president who became president could pick his own successor by choosing his own secretary of state. In 1947, the law was changed to make the Speaker of the House and then the president pro tempore of the Senate next in line for the presidency. But that created still other problems: a Speaker or a president pro tempore is likely to be chosen because of seniority, not executive skill, and in any event might well be of the party opposite to that occupying the White House.

Both problems were addressed in 1967 by the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution. It deals with the disability problem by allowing the vice president to serve as “acting president” whenever the president declares he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office or whenever the vice president and a majority of the cabinet declare that the president is incapacitated. If the president disagrees with the opinion of his vice president and a majority of the cabinet, then Congress decides the issue. A two-thirds majority is necessary to confirm that the president is unable to serve.

The amendment deals with the succession problem by requiring a vice president who assumes the presidency (after a vacancy is created by death or resignation) to nominate a new vice president. This person takes office if the nomination is confirmed by a majority vote of both houses of Congress. When there is no vice president, then the 1947 law governs: next in line are the Speaker, the Senate president, and the 15 cabinet officers, beginning with the secretary of state.

* The word he actually used was a good deal stronger than spit, but historians are decorous.
The disability problem has not arisen since the adoption of the amendment, but the succession problem has. In 1973, Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned, having pleaded no contest to criminal charges. President Nixon nominated Gerald Ford as vice president, and after extensive hearings he was confirmed by both houses of Congress and sworn in. Then on August 9, 1974, Nixon resigned the presidency—the first man to do so—and Ford became president. He nominated as his vice president Nelson Rockefeller, who was confirmed by both houses of Congress—again, after extensive hearings—and was sworn in on December 19, 1974. For the first time in history, the nation had as its two principal executive officers men who had not been elected to either the presidency or the vice-presidency. It is a measure of the legitimacy of the Constitution that this arrangement caused no crisis in public opinion.

**IMPEACHMENT**

There is one other way—besides death, disability, or resignation—by which a president can leave office before his term expires, and that is by impeachment. Not only the president and vice president, but also all “civil officers of the United States” can be removed by being impeached and convicted. As a practical matter civil officers—cabinet secretaries, bureau chiefs, and the like—are not subject to impeachment, because the president can remove them at any time and usually will if their behavior makes them a serious political liability. Federal judges, who serve during “good behavior” and who are constitutionally independent of the president and Congress, have been the most frequent objects of impeachment.

An impeachment is like an indictment in a criminal trial: a set of charges against somebody, voted by (in this case) the House of Representatives. To be removed from office, the impeached officer must be convicted by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, which sits as a court, is presided over by the Chief Justice, hears the evidence, and makes its decision under whatever rules it wishes to adopt. Sixteen persons have been impeached by the House, and seven have been convicted by the Senate. The last conviction was in 1989, when two federal judges were removed from office.

Only two presidents have ever been impeached—Andrew Johnson in 1868 and Bill Clinton in 1998. Richard Nixon would surely have been impeached in 1974, had he not resigned after the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend impeachment.

The Senate did not convict either Johnson or Clinton by the necessary two-thirds vote. The case against Johnson was entirely political—Radical Republicans, who wished to punish the South after the Civil War, were angry at Johnson, a southerner, who had a soft policy toward the South. The argument against him was flimsy.

The case against Clinton was more serious. The House Judiciary Committee, relying on the report of independent counsel Kenneth Starr, charged Clinton with perjury (lying under oath about his sexual affair with Monica Lewinsky), obstruction of justice (trying to block the Starr investigation), and abuse of power (making false written statements to the Judiciary Committee). The vote to impeach was passed by the House along party lines. The Senate vote fell far short of the two-thirds required for conviction.

Why did Clinton survive? There were many factors. The public disliked his private behavior, but did not think it amounted to an impeachable offense. (In fact, right after Lewinsky revealed her sexual affair with him, his standing in opinion polls went up.) The economy was strong, and the nation was at peace. Clinton was a centrist Democrat who did not offend most voters.

The one casualty of the entire episode was the death of the law creating the office of the Independent Counsel. Passed in 1978 by a Congress that was upset by the Watergate crisis, the law directed the attorney general to ask a three-judge panel to appoint an independent counsel whenever a high official is charged with serious misconduct. (In 1993, when the 1978 law expired, President Clinton asked that it be passed again. It was.) Eighteen people were investigated by various independent counsels from 1978 to 1999. In about half the cases, no charges were brought to court.

For a long time, Republicans disliked the law because the counsels were investigating them. After Clinton came to office, the counsels started investigating him and his associates, and so the Democrats began to oppose it. In 1999, when the law expired, it was not renewed.

A problem remains, however. How will any high official, including the president, be investigated when the attorney general, who does most investigations,
is part of the president's team? One answer is to let Congress do it, but Congress may be controlled by the president's party. No one has yet solved this puzzle.

Some Founders may have thought that impeachment would be used frequently against presidents, but as a practical matter it is so complex and serious an undertaking that we can probably expect it to be reserved in the future only for the gravest forms of presidential misconduct. No one quite knows what a high crime or misdemeanor is, but most scholars agree that the charge must involve something illegal or unconstitutional, not just unpopular. Unless a president or vice president is first impeached and convicted, many experts believe he is not liable to prosecution as would be an ordinary citizen. (No one is certain, because the question has never arisen.) President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon meant that he could not be prosecuted under federal law for things he may have done while in office.

Students may find the occasions of misconduct or disability remote and the details of succession or impeachment tedious. But the problem is not remote—succession has occurred nine times and disability at least twice—and what may appear tedious goes, in fact, to the heart of the presidency. The first and fundamental problem is to make the office legitimate. That was the great task George Washington set himself, and that was the substantial accomplishment of his successors. Despite bitter and sometimes violent partisan and sectional strife, beginning almost immediately after Washington stepped down, presidential succession has always occurred peacefully, without a military coup or a political plot. For centuries, in the bygone times of kings as well as in the present times of dictators and juntas, peaceful succession has been a rare event among the nations of the world. Many of the critics of the Constitution believed in 1787 that peaceful succession would not happen in the United States either: somehow the president would connive to hold office for life or to handpick his successor. Their predictions were wrong, though their fears are understandable.

### How Powerful Is the President?

Just as members of Congress bemoan their loss of power, so presidents bemoan theirs. Can both be right?

In fact, they can. If Congress is less able to control events than it once was, it does not mean that the president is thereby more able to exercise control. The federal government as a whole has become more constrained, so it is less able to act decisively. The chief source of this constraint is the greater complexity of the issues with which Washington must deal.

It was one thing to pass the Social Security Act in 1935; it is quite another thing to keep the Social Security system adequately funded. It was one thing for the nation to defend itself when attacked in 1941; it is quite another to maintain a constant military preparedness while simultaneously exploring possibilities for arms control. It was not hard to give pensions to veterans; it seems almost impossible today to find the cure for drug abuse or juvenile crime.

In the face of modern problems, all branches of government, including the presidency, seem both big and ineffectual. Add to this the much closer and more critical scrutiny of the media and the proliferation of interest groups, and it is small wonder that both presidents and members of Congress feel that they have lost power.

Presidents have come to acquire certain rules of thumb for dealing with their political problems. Among them are these:

- **Move it or lose it.** A president who wants to get something done should do it early in his term, before his political influence erodes.

- **Avoid details.** President Carter's lieutenants regret having tried to do too much. Better to have three or four top priorities and forget the rest.

- **Cabinets don't get much accomplished; people do.** Find capable White House subordinates and give them well-defined responsibility; then watch them closely.
WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

MEMORANDUM

To: White House Chief of Staff Ann Martin
From: Office of Legislative Affairs Director Sean Rivera
Subject: Passing budget bills under divided government

With the opposition party in control of Congress, media pundits and other commentators are calling for the president to accept the other party’s agenda for the next round of budget bills.

Arguments for:
1. With a reelection battle around the corner, the president cannot afford to get caught up in a budget battle with Congress.
2. The president’s ability to gain public support for his agenda is limited, and even increased public support will not improve leverage with Congress.
3. The president should defer to Congress as the primary representative of the people in American politics.

Arguments against:
1. American politics is guided too often by campaigns, and the president will build support for reelection by acting presidential—that is, by setting the agenda for the budget and not backing down.
2. The president can build public support through speeches and other forms of communication, and this support can be used as political capital to negotiate with Congress.
3. The president is the only nationally elected official in American politics (other than the vice president), and therefore is responsible for identifying and promoting public priorities, even if this means legislative battles with Congress.

Your decision:
Favor plan ________________  Oppose ban ________________
LEARNING OBJECTIVES

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

✓ How do presidents differ from prime ministers?
  Unlike prime ministers, American presidents are elected independently of Congress, which gives them both more independence in governing and more challenges in building political coalitions.

✓ How have the constitutional and political powers of the presidency evolved from the founding of the United States to the present?
  Presidential power has grown significantly from its constitutional origins. Since the 1930s, the president has become the central figure in American politics, even though the president’s ability to achieve political success remains highly dependent on other individuals and institutions.

✓ How do presidents make policy?
  To make policy, a president must work closely with Congress and the federal bureaucracy, while being attentive to public and political party expectations, as well as media scrutiny.

RECONSIDERING WHO GOVERNS?

1. Did the Founders expect the presidency to be the most important political institution?
   Most did not. They worried about whether the presidency would be too strong or too weak, but designed a Constitution hoping that Congress would be the most important institution. And it was, with a few exceptions, until the 20th century. Today, the strength of the presidency depends chiefly on two things: the importance of military and foreign affairs and the president’s personal popularity.

2. How important is the president’s character in determining how he governs?
   Very important. Presidents with great personal skills, such as Franklin Roosevelt, Dwight Eisenhower, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton can influence public opinion and that in turn influences Congress. But character is not the whole story. Having a majority of fellow believers in Congress, though rare, is important (as it was for Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson), and so are unexpected events, such as wars and other crises.
RECONSIDERING TO WHAT ENDS?

1. Should we abolish the electoral college?
   There are big risks in doing that. If no president were to win a majority of the popular vote (which happens quite often), there would either have to be a runoff election or the House would make the final decision. Without an electoral college, small parties would play a bigger role and the United States could politically come to look like France or Italy. And without the college, a presidential campaign might be waged in just a few big states with the candidates ignoring most places.

2. Is it harder to govern when the presidency and Congress are controlled by different political parties?
   Not really. Both the Democratic and Republican parties have legislators who often vote with their party rivals. Unless the president has a big ideological majority in Congress, something that does not happen too often, he can easily lose legislative struggles. Gridlock does not in fact prevent major new pieces of legislation from being passed.

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. How are presidents more and less powerful than prime ministers?
2. How has the balance of power between the presidency and Congress changed over time?
3. In the modern era, how does the president influence policymaking?
4. Is constitutional reform of the presidency needed? What changes, if any, are most important in the 21st century?
5. Who works in the White House?
6. How closely do the president and Congress share policy priorities?
7. How often does the president communicate with the public?
8. How do the legacies of modern presidents compare with those of their predecessors?

TO LEARN MORE

Official White House blog:
www.whitehouse.gov

Studies of presidents:
Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia:
www.millercenter.virginia.edu/academic/americanpresident

The American Presidency Project, University of California at Santa Barbara:
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
GENERAL

Cohen, Jeffrey E. *Going Local: Presidential Leadership in the Post-Broadcast Age*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Examines how party polarization and an increasingly decentralized media have led presidents to target their public communications to local audiences over the national arena.


ON FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT


ON HARRY S. TRUMAN


ON DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER


ON JOHN F. KENNEDY


ON LYNDON B. JOHNSON


ON RICHARD M. NIXON

ON JIMMY CARTER

ON RONALD REAGAN

ON GEORGE H. W. BUSH

ON BILL CLINTON

ON GEORGE W. BUSH


ON BARACK OBAMA