In 1835, a French political official, Alexis de Tocqueville, visited the United States to conduct research on its prison systems. Based on two years of travel across the country, de Tocqueville wrote a two-volume study titled *Democracy in America* that continues to be one of the defining texts of American political culture. De Tocqueville argued that democracy endured in the United States because of geography, laws, and “the manners and customs of the people.” He concluded that the attitude of Americans about the merits of democracy was fundamental to its success here.

In the 21st century, several issues divide Americans: how to address the rapidly growing national debt, how to battle terrorists, how to determine the appropriate scope of responsibility and power for the federal government, and so forth. But the political parties and interest groups (both of which we will discuss later in this textbook) that disagree about these issues share a common belief in preserving the principles of American constitutionalism—liberty, equality of opportunity, and so on—even if they differ over how to put those principles in practice. The Tea Party movement that has developed in recent years, for example, derives its name from a historic event in American politics, and its adherents claim that they seek to return American democracy to its founding principles. People in the United States may have very different views today of what democracy means for policymaking, but they continue to display the same veneration for democracy that de Tocqueville identified more than 175 years ago.

The United States, Great Britain, and France are all western nations with well-established representative democracies. Millions of people in each country (maybe including you) have been tourists in one or both of the other two countries. Ask any American who has spent time in either country “what’s it like?” and you probably will hear generalizations about the “culture”—“friendly” or “cold,” “very different” or “surprisingly like home,” and so on.
Political Culture

But “culture” also counts when it comes to politics and government. Politically speaking, there are at least three major differences among and between countries: constitutional, demographic, and cultural. Each difference is important, and the differences tend to feed each other. Arguably, however, the cultural differences are not only the most consequential, but also often the trickiest to analyze. As we will see, that holds not only for cross-national differences between America and other countries, but also when it comes to deciphering political divides within America itself. And the differences usually endure over time.

Constitutional differences tend to be fairly obvious and easy to summarize. America and France each have a written constitution, while Great Britain does not. The United States separates powers between three equal branches of its national government. By contrast, the United Kingdom has a parliamentary system in which the legislature chooses a prime minister from within its own ranks. And France has a semi-presidential or quasi-parliamentary system divided into three branches: the president selects a prime minister from the majority
party in the lower house of the parliament, and the prime minister exercises most executive powers.

Demographic differences are also straightforward. America is a large land with more than 300 million citizens. The dominant language is English, but millions of people also speak Spanish. About one-sixth of its population is Hispanic. More than 80 percent of its adults identify themselves as Christians, but they are divided between Catholics (about a quarter) and more than a dozen different Protestant denominations. By comparison, France and the United Kingdom are each home to about 60 million people and have small but growing immigrant and foreign-born subpopulations. Most French (more than 80 percent) are Catholic; most British belong to the Church of England (Anglican, the official state religion) or the Church of Scotland. But in neither country do many people go to church.

The differences among these three democracies go much deeper. Each country has a different political culture—a patterned and sustained way of thinking about how political and economic life ought to be carried out. Most Americans, British, and French think that democracy is good, favor majority rule, and believe in respecting minority rights. And few in each nation would say that a leader who loses office in an election has any right to retake office by force. Even so, their political cultures differ. Cross-national surveys consistently find that Americans are far more likely than the French or British to believe that everybody should be equal politically, but far less likely to think it important that everybody should be equal economically. For example, in one large survey, the French and British were more than twice as likely as Americans to agree that “it is government’s responsibility to take care of the very poor,” and less than a third as likely as Americans to agree that “government should not guarantee every citizen food and basic shelter.”

When it comes to ensuring political equality or equality before the law, Americans are more committed from an early age. For instance, a classic study compared how children aged 10 to 14 in the United States, Great Britain, and France responded to a series of questions about democracy and the law. They were asked to imagine the following:

One day the President (substitute the Queen in England, President of the Republic in France) was driving his car to a meeting. Because he was late, he was driving very fast. The police stopped the car. Finish the story.

The children from each country ended the story quite differently. French children declared that the president would not be reprimanded. British children said the queen would not be punished. But American children were most likely to say that the president would be fined or ticketed, just like any other person should be.

Cross-national differences wrought by political culture seem to be even sharper between America and such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines. Why do these countries, whose constitutions are very much like the American one, have so much trouble with corruption, military takeovers, and the rise of demagogues? Each of these nations has had periods of democratic rule, but only for a short period of time, despite having an elected president, a separately elected congress, and an independent judiciary.

Some have argued that democracy took root in the United States but not in other countries that copied its constitution because America offered more abundant land and greater opportunities for people.
At the height of immigration to this country, there was a striking emphasis on creating a shared political culture. Schoolchildren, whatever their national origin, were taught to salute this country’s flag.

No feudal aristocracy occupied the land, taxes remained low, and when one place after another filled up, people kept pushing west to find new opportunities. America became a nation of small, independent farmers with relatively few landless peasants or indentured servants.

However, as Alexis de Tocqueville, the perceptive French observer of American politics, noted in the 1830s, much of South America contains fertile land and rich resources, but democracy has not flourished there. The constitution and the physical advantages of the land cannot by themselves explain the persistence of any nation’s democratic institutions. Nor can they account for the fact that American democracy survived a Civil War and thrived as wave after wave of immigrants became citizens and made the democracy more demographically diverse. What can begin to account for such differences are the customs of the people—what de Tocqueville called their “moral and intellectual characteristics,” and what social scientists today call political culture.

Japan, like the United States, is a democracy. But while America is an immigrant nation that often has favored open immigration policies, Japan remains a Japanese nation in which immigration policies are highly restrictive and foreign-born citizens are few. America, like Saudi Arabia, is a country in which most people profess religious beliefs, and many people identify themselves as orthodox believers. But America’s Christian majority favors religious pluralism and church-state separation, while Saudi Arabia’s Muslim majority supports laws that maintain Islam as the state religion. In Germany, courts have held that non-Christian religious symbols and dress, but not Christian ones, may be banned from schools and other public places. In France, the government forbids wearing any religious garb in schools. In the United States, such rulings or restrictions would be unthinkable.

**THE POLITICAL SYSTEM**

There are at least five important elements in the American view of the political system:

- **Liberty:** Americans are preoccupied with their rights. They believe they should be free to do pretty much as they please, with some exceptions, as long as they don’t hurt other people.

- **Equality:** Americans believe everybody should have an equal vote and an equal chance to participate and succeed.

- **Democracy:** Americans think government officials should be accountable to the people.

- **Civic duty:** Americans generally feel people ought to take community affairs seriously and help out when they can.

- **Individual responsibility:** A characteristically American view is that, barring some disability, individuals are responsible for their own actions and well-being.

By vast majorities, Americans believe that every citizen should have an equal chance to influence government policy and to hold public office, and they oppose the idea of letting people have titles such as “Lord” or “Duke,” as in England. By somewhat smaller majorities, they believe people should be allowed to vote even if they can’t read or write or vote intelligently. Though Americans recognize that people differ in their abilities, they overwhelmingly agree with the statement that “teaching children that all people are really equal recognizes that all people are equally worthy and deserve equal treatment.”

At least three questions can be raised about this political culture. First, how do we know that the American people share these beliefs? For most of our history there were no public opinion polls, and even after they became commonplace, they were rather crude tools for measuring the existence and meaning of complex, abstract ideas. There is in fact no way to prove that values such as those listed above are important to Americans. But neither is there good reason for dismissing the list out of hand. One can infer, as have many scholars, the existence of certain values by a close study of the kinds of books Americans read, the speeches they hear, the slogans to which they respond, and the political choices
they make, as well as by noting the observations of insightful foreign visitors. Personality tests as well as opinion polls, particularly those asking similar questions in different countries, also supply useful evidence, some of which will be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

Second, if these values are important to Americans, how can we explain the existence in our society of behavior that is obviously inconsistent with them? For example, if white Americans believe in equality of opportunity, why did so many of them for so long deny that equality to African Americans? That people act contrary to their professed beliefs is an everyday fact of life: people believe in honesty, yet they steal from their employers and sometimes underreport their taxable income. Besides values, self-interest and social circumstances also shape behavior. Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish observer of American society, described race relations in this country as “an American dilemma” resulting from the conflict between the “American creed” (a belief in equality of opportunity) and American behavior (denying African Americans full citizenship).8 But the creed remains important because it is a source of change: as more and more people become aware of the inconsistency between their values and their behavior, that behavior slowly changes.9 Race relations in this country would take a very different course if instead of an abstract but widespread belief in equality there were an equally widespread belief that one race is inherently inferior to another.

The late political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, put it this way: “Critics say that America is a lie because its reality falls so far short of its ideals. America is not a lie, it is a disappointment. And it can be a disappointment only because it is also a hope.”10

Third, if there is agreement among Americans on certain political values, why has there been so much political conflict in our history? How could a people who agree on such fundamentals fight a bloody civil war, engage in violent labor-management disputes, take to the streets in riots and demonstrations, and sue each other in countless court battles? Conflict, even violent struggles, can occur over specific policies even among those who share, at some level of abstraction, common beliefs. Many political values may be irrelevant to specific controversies: there is no abstract value, for example, that would settle the question of whether steelworkers ought to organize unions. More important, much of our conflict has occurred precisely because we have strong beliefs that happen, as each of us interprets them, to be in conflict. Equality of opportunity seems an attractive idea, but sometimes it can be pursued only by curtailing personal liberty, another attractive idea. The states went to war in 1861 over one aspect of that conflict—the rights of slaves versus the rights of slaveowners.

Indeed, the Civil War illustrates the way certain fundamental beliefs about how a democratic regime ought to be organized have persisted despite bitter conflict over the policies adopted by particular governments. When the southern states seceded from the Union, they formed not a wholly different government but one modeled, despite some important differences, on the U.S. Constitution. Even some of the language of the Constitution was duplicated, suggesting that the southern states believed not that a new form of government or a different political culture ought to be created but that the South was the true repository of the existing constitutional and cultural order.11

Perhaps the most frequently encountered evidence that Americans believe themselves bound by common values and common hopes has been the persistence of the word Americanism in our political vocabulary. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Americanism and the American dream were familiar terms not only in Fourth of July speeches but also in everyday discourse. For many years, the House of Representatives had a committee called the House Un-American Activities Committee. There is hardly any example to be found abroad of such a way of thinking: There is no “Britishism” or “Frenchism,” and when Britons and French people become worried about subversion, they call it a problem of internal security, not a manifestation of “un-British” or “un-French” activities.

THE PERSISTENCE OF CONFLICT

We have ended slavery, endorsed civil rights, and expanded the scope of free discussion, but these gains have not ended political conflict. We argue about abortion, morality, religion, immigration, and affirmative action. Some people believe that core moral principles are absolute while others feel they are relative to the situation. Some people believe all immigrants should become like every other American while others argue that we should, in the name of diversity and multiculturalism, celebrate group differences.

Much depends on how we define a good citizen. Some people define them as persons who vote, pay their taxes, obey the law, and support the military; others describe them as skeptical of government and ready to join protest movements and boycott products they do not like. A recent study has suggested that these competing opinions reflect differences in age and
education. Older people, especially those who experienced the Great Depression and World War II, are more likely to take the first view, while those born between 1964 and 1984 and who have been to college are more likely to take the second. These two generations don’t quite trust one another. The older generation thinks the younger one is alienated, distrustful, self-centered, and lacking in clear moral guidance. The younger group, often described as Generation X because they were born after the Baby Boomers, responds by saying that older people are rigid, conformist, overly supportive of the status quo, and too impressed by the military.

But these conflicts, though they affect every American, should not obscure the underlying level of agreement. Consider how different ethnic groups think about this country. When asked whether they “love” this country, the overwhelming majority of whites, blacks, and Hispanics say they do (see Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>How strongly do you love America?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>91</td>
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In the 1950s Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was the inspiration for the word “McCarthyism” after his highly publicized attacks on alleged communists working in the federal government.

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM

Americans judge the economic system using many of the same standards by which they judge the political system, albeit with some very important differences. As it is in American politics, liberty is important in the U.S. economy. Thus Americans support the idea of a free-enterprise economic system, calling the nation’s economy “generally fair and efficient” and denying that it “survives by keeping the poor down.” However, there are limits to how much freedom they think should exist in the marketplace. People support government regulation of business in order to keep some firms from becoming too powerful and to correct specific abuses.

Americans are more willing to tolerate economic inequality than political inequality. They believe in maintaining “equality of opportunity” in the economy but not “equality of results.” If everyone has an equal opportunity to get ahead, then it is all right for people with more ability to earn higher salaries and for wages to be set based on how hard people work rather than on their economic needs. Hardly anyone is upset by the fact that Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, and Donald Trump are rich men. Although Americans are quite willing to support education and training programs to help disadvantaged people get ahead, they are strongly opposed to anything that looks like preferential treatment (for example, hiring quotas) in the workplace.

The leaders of very liberal political groups, such as civil rights and feminist organizations, are more willing than the average American to support preferential treatment in the hiring and promoting of minorities and women. They do so because, unlike most citizens, they believe that whatever disadvantages minorities and women face are the result of failures of the economic system rather than the fault of individuals. Even so, these leaders strongly support the idea that earnings should be based on ability and oppose the idea of having any top limit on what people can earn.

This popular commitment to economic individualism and personal responsibility may help explain how Americans think about particular public policies, such as welfare and civil rights. Polls show that Americans are willing to help people “truly in need” (this includes the elderly and the disabled) but not those deemed “able to take care of themselves” (this includes, in the public’s mind, people “on welfare”). Also, Americans dislike preferential hiring programs and the use of quotas to deal with racial inequality.
Do Hispanics Embrace American Political Culture?

Hispanics are the largest and fastest-growing minority group in America. The nation’s Hispanic population surpassed 48 million in 2009, representing about 16 percent of the total U.S. population. They comprise more than a third of the population in several states including California, New Mexico, and Texas.

In recent years, some analysts have asserted that Hispanic immigrants to the United States, the vast majority of whom come from Mexico, will remain strangers to American political culture. Among the most provocative of these analysts is Harvard political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, who has argued that the sheer number, concentration, and ostensible linguistic homogeneity of Hispanics in America will promote ethnic allegiances at odds with bedrock American beliefs about politics and government.

University of California at Berkeley political scientist Jack Citrin and other researchers tested Huntington’s controversial contentions about Hispanic immigrants. Contrary to Huntington’s dire predictions, all the evidence suggests that, if anything, Hispanic immigrants over time are far more likely to embrace and emulate, rather than to reject or refashion, American political culture.

- **Linguistic adaptation**: Regardless of age, educational level, or residential concentration, Hispanic immigrants from one generation to the next speak English as their first language (by the third generation, 71 percent are English-dominant).
- **Hyphenated-American identity**: Most Hispanics think of themselves as both American and Hispanic; and once Hispanic immigrants become citizens, they become far more likely to identify either as “just an American” or as “Hispanic-American.”
- **Religiosity**: Measured by professed importance of religion and rates of church attendance, Hispanics are no more or less religious than non-Hispanic whites.
- **Patriotism**: 91 percent of Hispanic-Americans say they “love America,” and 86 percent express “pride in the American flag.”
- **Work ethic**: The higher the proportion of Hispanics living and working in a given state, the more likely it is that non-Hispanics will agree that Hispanics are especially hardworking.

Also contrary to Huntington’s Mexican-specific thesis, the data analyses by Citrin and his colleagues, like most other recent empirical studies of the subject, suggest that generation-by-generation, Mexican-born Hispanic immigrants’ social, economic, and personal ties to Mexico diminish.

In sum, the latest and best research offers this prediction: most Hispanic immigrant families, like most Italian and other European immigrant families into the early and mid-20th century, will continue to adapt, will adopt American political culture, and will make a hyphenated American identity all their own.

**RESEARCH FRONTIERS**

At the core of these policy attitudes is a widely (but not universally) shared commitment to economic individualism and personal responsibility. Some scholars, among them Donald Kinder and David Sears, interpret these individualistic values as “symbolic racism”—a kind of plausible camouflage for antiblack attitudes. But other scholars, such as Paul M. Sniderman and Michael Gray Hagen, argue that these views are not a smoke screen for bigotry or insensitivity but a genuine commitment to the ethic of self-reliance. Since there are many Americans on both sides of this issue, debates about welfare and civil rights tend to be especially intense. What is striking about the American political culture is that in this country the individualist view of social policy is by far the most popular.
Views about specific economic policies change. Americans now are much more inclined than they once were to believe that the government should help the needy and regulate business. But the commitment to certain underlying principles has been remarkably enduring. In 1924, almost half of the high school students in Muncie, Indiana, said that “it is entirely the fault of the man himself if he cannot succeed” and disagreed with the view that differences in wealth showed that the system was unjust. More than half a century later, the students in this same high school were asked the same questions again, with the same results.

How We Compare: Comparing America with Other Nations

Americans like their own country more than people in European democracies like theirs. In Table 4.2, we see that 71 percent of Americans are proud to be an American compared to only 21 percent of Germans who are proud to be Germans. There are other differences as well: a majority of the French, Germans, and Italians think success in life is determined by forces outside an individual’s own control; Americans deeply disagree. Most Americans think children should be taught the value of hard work and that a belief in God is necessary for morality; most western European countries have the opposite view.

America is not very popular abroad, but these data suggest that the reasons go well beyond the war in Iraq or the criticism of former president George W. Bush. Americans have very different views about important things than Europeans. Following are some examples drawn from politics, the economy, and religion.

The Political System

Sweden has a well-developed democratic government, with a constitution, free speech, an elected legislature, competing political parties, and a reasonably honest and nonpartisan bureaucracy. But the Swedish political culture is significantly different from ours; it is more deferential than participatory. Though almost all adult Swedes vote in national elections, few participate in politics in any other way. They defer to the decisions of experts and specialists who work for the government, rarely challenge governmental decisions in court, believe leaders and legislators ought to decide issues on the basis of “what is best” more than on “what the people want,” and value equality as much as (or more than) liberty. Whereas Americans are contentious, Swedes value harmony; while Americans tend to assert their rights, Swedes tend to observe their obligations.

The contrast in political cultures is even greater when one looks at a nation, such as Japan, with a wholly different history and set of traditions. One study compared the values expressed by a small number of upper-status Japanese with those of some similarly situated Americans. Whereas the Americans emphasized the virtues of individualism, competition, and equality in their political, economic, and social relations, the Japanese attached greater value to maintaining good relations with colleagues,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pride</th>
<th>Outside Control</th>
<th>Teach Value of Work</th>
<th>God and Morality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key to columns:
- **Pride:** “I am very proud to be a member of [country]”
- **Outside Control:** “Success in life is determined by forces outside our control”
- **Teach Value of Work:** “Children should be taught the value of hard work”
- **God and Morality:** “It is necessary to believe in God to be moral”

having decisions made by groups, preserving social harmony, and displaying respect for hierarchy. The Americans were more concerned than the Japanese with rules and with treating others fairly but impersonally, with due regard for their rights. The Japanese, on the other hand, stressed the importance of being sensitive to the personal needs of others, avoiding conflict, and reaching decisions through discussion rather than the application of rules.  

A classic study of political culture in five nations found that Americans, and to a lesser degree citizens of Great Britain, had a stronger sense of civic duty (a belief that one has an obligation to participate in civic and political affairs) and a stronger sense of civic competence (a belief that one can affect government policies) than the citizens of Germany, Italy, or Mexico. More than half of all Americans and a third of all Britons believed the average citizen ought to “be active in one’s community,” compared to only a tenth in Italy and a fifth in Germany. Moreover, many more Americans and Britons than Germans, Italians, or Mexicans believed they could “do something” about an unjust national law or local regulation. A more recent study of citizen participation in politics found that while America lagged behind Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom in voter participation, when it came to campaign- ing, attending political meetings, becoming active in the local community, and contacting government officials, Americans were as active—or substantially more active—than citizens elsewhere.  

Today the American people have less trust in government than they once did. But even so, popular confidence in political institutions remains higher here than in many places abroad. In cross-national surveys conducted in the United States and 16 other democracies, Americans expressed more confidence in public institutions (the police, the armed forces, the legal system, and the civil service) than the citizens of all but four other countries (Denmark, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Norway), and greater confidence in private institutions (the church, major companies, the press, trade unions) than the citizens of any other nation. In other cross-national surveys, Americans were more likely than the French or Germans to say they were “very patriotic” (see Figure 4.1). Of course, Americans know that their country has a lot of faults. But even the most disaffected voters believe the United States needs to change only certain policies, not its system of government.  

THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM  

The political culture of Sweden is not only more deferential than ours but also more inclined to favor equality of results over equality of opportunity. Sidney Verba and Gary Orren compared the views of Swedish and American trade union and political party leaders on a variety of economic issues. In both countries, the leaders were chosen from either blue-collar unions or the major liberal political party (the Democrats in the United States, the Social Democrats in Sweden).  

The results are quite striking. By margins of four or five to one, the Swedish leaders were more likely to believe in giving workers equal pay than their

**Figure 4.1**

Political Culture in America and Other Democracies

![Graph showing political culture in America and other democracies.](image)
American counterparts. Moreover, by margins of at least three to one, the Swedes were more likely than the Americans to favor putting a top limit on incomes.\textsuperscript{27}

Just what these differences in beliefs mean in dollars-and-cents terms was revealed by the answers to another question. Each group was asked what should be the ratio between the income of an executive and that of a menial worker (a dishwasher in Sweden, an elevator operator in the United States). The Swedish leaders said the ratio should be a little over two to one. That is, if the dishwasher earned $200 a week, the executive should earn no more than $440 to $480 a week. But the American leaders were ready to let the executive earn between $2,260 and $3,040 per week when the elevator operator was earning $200.

Americans, compared to people in many other countries, are more likely to think that freedom is more important than equality and less likely to think that hard work goes unrewarded or that the government should guarantee citizens a basic standard of living. These cultural differences make a difference in politics. In fact, there is less income inequality in Sweden than in the United States—the government sees to that.

THE CIVIC ROLE OF RELIGION

In the 1830s, de Tocqueville was amazed at how religious Americans were in comparison to his fellow Europeans. From the first days of the new Republic to the present, America has been among the most religious countries in the world. The average American is more likely than the average European to believe in God, to pray on a daily basis, and to acknowledge clear standards of right and wrong.\textsuperscript{28}

Religious people donate more than three times as much money to charity as secular people, even when the incomes of the two groups are the same, and they volunteer their time twice as often. And this is true whether or not religious people go to church or synagogue regularly. Moreover, religious people are more likely to give money and donate time to nonreligious organizations, such as the Red Cross, than secular people.\textsuperscript{29} It is clear that religion in America has a large effect on our culture.

It also affects our politics. The religious revivalist movement of the late 1730s and early 1740s (known as the First Great Awakening) transformed the political life of the American colonies. Religious ideas fueled the break with England, which, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, had violated “the laws of nature and nature’s God.” Religious leaders were central to the struggle over slavery in the 19th century and the temperance movement of the early 20th century.

Both liberals and conservatives have used the pulpit to promote political change. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was led mainly by black religious leaders, most prominently Martin Luther King, Jr. In the 1980s, a conservative

A chaplain offers a prayer at a meeting of the U.S. Congress. Though having such a chaplain may appear to violate the separation of church and state, the Supreme Court has upheld it on grounds of “tradition.”
religious group known as the Moral Majority advocated constitutional amendments that would allow prayer in public schools and ban abortion. In the 1990s, another conservative religious group, the Christian Coalition, attracted an enormous amount of media attention and became a prominent force in many national, state, and local elections.

Candidates for national office in most contemporary democracies mention religion rarely if they mention it at all. Not so in America. During the 2000 presidential campaign, for example, both Democratic candidate Al Gore and Republican candidate George W. Bush gave major speeches extolling the virtues of religion and advocating the right of religious organizations that deliver social services to receive government funding on the same basis as all other nonprofit organizations.

The general feeling about religion became apparent when a federal appeals court in 2002 tried to ban the Pledge of Allegiance because it contained the phrase “under God.” There was an overwhelming and bipartisan condemnation of the ruling. To a degree that would be almost unthinkable in many other democracies, religious beliefs will probably continue to shape political culture in America for many generations to come. The Supreme Court, by deciding that the man who brought the case was not entitled to do so, left the Pledge intact without deciding whether it was constitutional.

The Sources of Political Culture

That Americans bring a distinctive way of thinking to their political life is easier to demonstrate than to explain. But even a brief, and necessarily superficial, effort to understand the sources of our political culture can help make its significance clearer.

The American Revolution, as we discussed in Chapter 2, was essentially a war fought over liberty: an assertion by the colonists of what they took to be their rights. Though the Constitution, produced 11 years after the Revolution, had to deal with other issues as well, its animating spirit reflected the effort to reconcile personal liberty with the needs of social control. These founding experiences, and the political disputes that followed, have given to American political thought and culture a preoccupation with the assertion and maintenance of rights. This tradition has imbued the daily conduct of U.S. politics with a kind of adversarial spirit quite foreign to the political life of countries that did not undergo a libertarian revolution or that were formed out of an interest in other goals, such as social equality, national independence, or ethnic supremacy.

The adversarial spirit of the American political culture reflects not only our preoccupation with rights but also our long-standing distrust of authority and of people wielding power. The colonies’ experiences with British rule were one source of that distrust. But another, older source was the religious belief of many Americans, which saw human nature as fundamentally depraved. To the colonists, all of mankind suffered from original sin, symbolized by Adam and Eve eating the forbidden fruit in the Garden of Eden. Since no one was born innocent, no one could be trusted with power. Thus, the Constitution had to be designed in such a way as to curb the darker side of human nature. Otherwise, everyone’s rights would be in jeopardy.

The contentiousness of a people animated by a suspicion of government and devoted to individualism could easily have made democratic politics so tumultuous as to be impossible. After all one must be willing to trust others with power if there is to be any kind of democratic government, and sometimes those others will be people not of one’s own choosing. The first great test case took place around 1800 in a battle between the Federalists, led by John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, and the Democratic-Republicans, led by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The two factions deeply distrusted each other: the Federalists had passed laws designed to suppress Jeffersonian journalists; Jefferson suspected the Federalists were out to subvert the Constitution; and the Federalists believed Jefferson intended to sell out the country to France. But as we shall see in Chapter 9, the threat of civil war never materialized, and the Jeffersonians came to power peacefully. Within a few years, the role of an opposition party became legitimate, and people abandoned the idea of making serious efforts to suppress their opponents. By happy circumstance, people came to accept that liberty and orderly political change could coexist.

The Constitution, by creating a federal system and dividing political authority among competing institutions, provided ample opportunity for widespread—though hardly universal—participation in politics. The election of Jefferson in 1800 produced no political catastrophe, and those who had predicted one were, to a degree, discredited. But other, more fundamental features of American life contributed to the same end. One of the most important of these was religious diversity.

The absence of an established or official religion for the nation as a whole, reinforced by a constitutional prohibition of such an establishment and by the
migration to this country of people with different religious backgrounds, meant that religious diversity was inevitable. Since there could be no orthodox official religion, it became difficult for a corresponding political orthodoxy to emerge. Moreover, the conflict between the Puritan tradition, with its emphasis on faith and hard work, and the Catholic Church, with its devotion to the sacraments and priestly authority, provided a recurrent source of cleavage in American public life. The differences in values between these two groups showed up not only in their religious practices but also in areas involving the regulation of manners and morals, and even in people's choice of political party. For more than a century, candidates for state and national office were deeply divided over whether the sale of liquor should be prohibited, a question that arose ultimately out of competing religious doctrines.

Even though there was no established church, there was certainly a dominant religious tradition—Protestantism, and especially Puritanism. The Protestant churches provided people with both a set of beliefs and an organizational experience that had profound effects on American political culture. Those beliefs encouraged, or even required, a life of personal achievement as well as religious conviction: a believer had an obligation to work, save money, obey the secular law, and do good works. Max Weber explained the rise of capitalism in part by what he called the Protestant ethic—what we now sometimes call the work ethic. Such values had political consequences, as people holding them were motivated to engage in civic and communal action.

Churches offered ready opportunities for developing and practicing civic and political skills. Since most Protestant churches were organized along congregational lines—that is, the church was controlled by its members, who put up the building, hired the preacher, and supervised the finances—they were, in effect, miniature political systems with leaders and committees, conflict and consensus. Developing a participatory political culture was undoubtedly made easier by the existence of a participatory religious culture. Even some Catholic churches in early America were under a degree of lay control. Parishioners owned the church property, negotiated with priests, and conducted church business.

All aspects of culture, including the political, are preserved and transmitted to new generations primarily by the family. Though some believe that the weakening of the family unit has eroded the extent to which it transmits anything, particularly culture, and has enlarged the power of other sources of values—the mass media and the world of friends and fashion, leisure, and entertainment—there is still little doubt that the ways in which we think about the world are largely acquired within the family. In Chapter 7, we shall see that the family is the primary source of one kind of political attitude—identification with one or another political party. Even more important, the family shapes in subtle ways how we think and act on political matters. Erik Erikson, the psychologist, noted certain traits that are more characteristic of American than of European families—the greater freedom enjoyed by children, for example, and the larger measure of equality among family members. These familial characteristics promote a belief, carried through life, that every person has rights deserving protection and that a variety of interests have a legitimate claim to consideration when decisions are made.

The combined effect of religious and ethnic diversity, an individualistic philosophy, fragmented political authority, and the relatively egalitarian American family can be seen in the absence of a high degree of class consciousness among Americans. Class consciousness means thinking of oneself as a worker whose interests are in opposition to those of management, or vice versa. In this country, most people, whatever their jobs, think of themselves as “middle class.”

Though the writings of Horatio Alger are no longer popular, Americans still seem to believe in the message of those stories—that the opportunity for success is available to people who work hard. This may help explain why the United States is the only large industrial democracy without a significant socialist party and why the nation has been slow to adopt certain welfare programs.

THE CULTURE WAR

Almost all Americans share some elements of a common political culture. Why, then, is there so much cultural conflict in American politics? For many years, the most explosive political issues have included abortion, gay rights, drug use, school prayer, and pornography. Viewed from a Marxist perspective, politics in the United States is utterly baffling: instead of two economic classes engaged in a bitter struggle over wealth, we have two cultural classes locked in a war over values.

As first formulated by sociologist James Davison Hunter, the idea is that there are, broadly defined,
two cultural classes in the United States: the **orthodox** and the **progressive**. On the orthodox side are people who believe that morality is as important as, or more important than, self-expression and that moral rules derive from the commands of God or the laws of nature—commands and laws that are relatively clear, unchanging, and independent of individual preferences. On the progressive side are people who think that personal freedom is as important as, or more important than, certain traditional moral rules and that those rules must be evaluated in light of the circumstances of modern life—circumstances that are quite complex, changeable, and dependent on individual preferences.32

Most conspicuous among the orthodox are fundamentalist Protestants and evangelical Christians, and so critics who dislike orthodox views often dismiss them as the fanatical expressions of “the Religious Right.” But many people who hold orthodox views are not fanatical or deeply religious or right-wing on most issues: they simply have strong views about drugs, pornography, and sexual morality. Similarly, the progressive side often includes members of liberal Protestant denominations (for example, Episcopalians and Unitarians) and people with no strong religious beliefs, and so their critics often denounce them as immoral, anti-Christian radicals who have embraced the ideology of secular humanism, the belief that moral standards do not require religious justification. But in all likelihood, few progressives are immoral or anti-Christian, and most do not regard secular humanism as their defining ideology.

Groups supporting and opposing the right to abortion have had many angry confrontations in recent years. The latter have been arrested while attempting to block access to abortion clinics; some clinics have been fire-bombed; and at least seven physicians have been killed. A controversy over what schoolchildren should be taught about homosexuals was responsible, in part, for the firing of the head of the New York City school system; in other states, there have been fierce arguments in state legislatures and before the courts over whether gay and lesbian couples should be allowed to marry or adopt children. Although most Americans want to keep heroin, cocaine, and other drugs illegal, a significant number of people want to legalize (or at least decriminalize) their use. The Supreme Court has ruled that there cannot be state-sponsored prayer in public schools, but this has not stopped many parents and school authorities from trying to reinstate school prayer, or at least prayer-like moments of silence. The discovery that a federal agency, the National Endowment for the Arts, had given money to support exhibitions and performances that many people thought were obscene led to a furious congressional struggle over the future of the agency.
The culture war differs from other political disputes (over such matters as taxes, business regulations, and foreign policy) in several ways: money is not always at stake, compromises are almost impossible to arrange, and the conflict is more profound. It is animated by deep differences in people’s beliefs about private and public morality—that is, about the standards that ought to govern individual behavior and social arrangements. It is about what kind of country we ought to live in, not just about what kinds of policies our government ought to adopt.

Two opposing views exist about the importance of the culture war. One view, developed by Morris Fiorina and others, holds that politically the culture war is a myth. While political leaders are polarized, most Americans occupy a middle position. Journalists write about the split between “blue states” (those that vote Democratic) and “red states” (those that vote Republican), but in fact popular views across both kinds of states on many policy issues are similar.

The rival view, developed by Alan Abramowitz and others, holds that more and more people are choosing their party affiliations on the basis of the party’s position on important issues. Moreover, a growing percentage of the public is politically engaged; that is, they do more to express their political views than simply vote.

Choosing between these two theories will take time, as we watch what happens in future elections. But even now, popular attitudes about issues such as the use of military force abroad are already deeply polarized.

**Figure 4.2**

![Graph showing trust in the federal government from 1958 to 2008.](image)

**QUESTION**

How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?

- Red: Just about always
- Purple: Most of the time
- Orange: Some of the time
- Blue: None of the time

**Note:** Data not available for 1960 and 1962.

**Source:** University of Michigan, *The American National Election Studies.*
never be expected to last no matter what any president did. After all, when President Eisenhower took office in 1952, we had won a war against fascism, overcome the Depression of the 1930s, possessed a near monopoly of the atom bomb, had a currency that was the envy of the world, and dominated international trade. Moreover, in those days not much was expected out of Washington. Hardly anybody thought there should be important federal laws about civil rights, crime, illegal drugs, the environment, the role of women, highway safety, or almost anything else now on the national agenda. Since nobody expected much out of Washington, nobody was upset that they didn’t get much out of it.

The 1960s and 1970s changed all of that. Domestic turmoil, urban riots, a civil rights revolution, the war in Vietnam, economic inflation, and a new concern for the environment dramatically increased what we expected Washington to do. And since these problems are very difficult ones to solve, a lot of people became convinced that our politicians couldn’t do much.35

Those events also pushed the feelings Americans had about their country—that is, their patriotism—into the background. We liked the country, but there weren’t many occasions when expressing that approval seemed to make much sense. But on September 11, 2001, when hijacked airliners were crashed by terrorists into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, all of that changed. There was an extraordinary outburst of patriotic fervor, with flags displayed everywhere, fire and police heroes widely celebrated, and strong national support for our going to war in Afghanistan to find the key terrorist, Osama bin Laden, and destroy the tyrannical Taliban regime that he supported. By November of that year, about half of all Americans of both political parties said they trusted Washington officials to do what is right most of the time, the highest level in many years.

Those who had hoped or predicted that this new level of support would last, not ebb and flow, have been disappointed. In October 2001, 57 percent of Americans (up from just 29 percent in July 2001) said they trusted the federal government to do what is right just about always or most of the time. But by May 2002, only 40 percent expressed such trust in the federal government, and 57 percent said they trusted Washington only some of the time or never.

Table 4.3 Confidence in American Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Churches</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schools</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor unions</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big business</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gallup Poll.

Only 12 percent of all Americans have a lot of confidence in Congress, but it—and the rest of the government—should not feel lonely. With few exceptions, Americans have lost confidence in many institutions. As Table 4.3 shows, newspapers, public schools, television news, and labor unions have all suffered a big drop during the last three decades. Only the military has gained support (71 percent of us say we have “a great deal” or “a lot” of confidence in it).

Because Americans are less likely than they once were to hold their leaders in high esteem, to have confidence in government policies, and to believe the system will be responsive to popular wishes, some observers like to say that Americans today are more “alienated” from politics. Perhaps this is true, but careful studies of the subject have not yet been able, for example, to demonstrate any relationship between overall levels of public trust in government or confidence in leaders, on the one hand, and the rates at which people come out to vote, on the other. There is, however, some evidence that the less voters trust political institutions and leaders, the more likely they are to support candidates from the nonincumbent major party (in two-candidate races) and third-party candidates.36

CIVIL SOCIETY

Distrust of governmental and other institutions makes more important the role of civil society, that collection of private, voluntary groups that—independent of the government and the commercial market—make human cooperation easier and provide ways of holding the government accountable for its actions.

The individualism of the American political culture makes civil society especially important. As we shall see in Chapter 11, Americans are more likely
than people in other democracies to join voluntary groups. These organizations teach people how to cooperate, develop community-serving skills, and increase social capital. This last phrase refers to the connections people have with each other through friendship, personal contact, and group efforts.

Several scholars, such as Robert Putnam, argue that the more a community has social capital, the greater the level of trust among its members. And the more trust that exists, the easier it is to achieve common goals such as improving a neighborhood, combating intolerance, and producing useful projects outside of government. Putnam worries that our social capital may be decreasing because people are less and less likely to join voluntary associations. In Putnam’s famous phrase, we once bowled in leagues; now we bowl alone. We once joined the PTA, the NAACP, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars; now we stay home and watch television or spend time on our computer.¹⁷

There are three qualifications to this argument. First, Americans still join more groups than people in most other democracies. Second, a general measure of civic health (that examines group membership and informal human contact) shows high engagement by group leaders (see Figure 4.3). Third, in ethnically and racially diverse communities, we “hunker down”—that is, we don’t trust our neighbors, contribute to charities, cooperate with others, or join voluntary groups.¹⁸ Just where we most need social capital, we do not have as much as we would like.

**Figure 4.3**

The American Civic Health Index, 2009

![Chart](chart.png)


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**Political Tolerance**

Democratic politics depends crucially on citizens’ reasonable tolerance of the opinions and actions of others. If unpopular speakers were always shouted down, if government efforts to censor newspapers were usually met with popular support or even public indifference, if peaceful demonstrations were regularly broken up by hostile mobs, if the losing candidates in an election refused to allow their victorious opponents to take office, then the essential elements of a democratic political culture would be missing, and democracy would fail. Democracy does not require perfect tolerance; if it did, the passions of human nature would make democracy forever impossible. But at a minimum, citizens must have a political culture that allows the discussion of ideas and the selection of rulers in an atmosphere reasonably free of oppression.

Public opinion surveys show that the overwhelming majority of Americans agree with concepts such as freedom of speech, majority rule, and the right to circulate petitions—at least in the abstract.¹⁹ But when we get down to concrete cases, a good many Americans are not very tolerant of groups they dislike. Suppose you must decide which groups will be permitted to espouse their causes at meetings held in your community’s civic auditorium. Which of these groups would you allow to run such a meeting?

1. Protestants holding a revival meeting
2. Right-to-life groups opposing abortion
3. People protesting a nuclear power plant
4. Feminists organizing a march for the Equal Rights Amendment
5. Gays organizing for homosexual rights
6. Atheists preaching against God
7. Students organizing a sit-in to shut down city hall

In general, Americans have become a bit more tolerant and more willing to tolerate public speech by communists, atheists, and homosexuals.²⁰ People are today more likely than in the past to say they are willing to vote for a qualified person who runs for president even if the candidate is a Catholic, a Jew, a woman, a black, or a homosexual.²¹

One person’s civic intolerance can be another person’s heartfelt display of civic concern. Most Americans believe that serious civic problems are rooted in a breakdown of moral values.²² Correctly or not, most citizens worry that the nation is becoming too tolerant of behaviors that harm society, and they favor defending common moral standards over protecting individual rights.
Nonetheless, this majority tolerance for many causes should not blind us to the fact that for most of us, there is some group or cause from which we are willing to withhold political liberties—even though we endorse those liberties in the abstract.

If most people dislike one or another group strongly enough to deny it certain political rights that we usually take for granted, how is it that such groups (and such rights) survive? The answer, in part, is that most of us don't act on our beliefs. We rarely take the trouble—or have the chance—to block another person from making a speech or teaching school. Some scholars have argued that among people who are in a position to deny other people rights—officeholders and political activists, for example—the level of political tolerance is somewhat greater than among the public at large, but that claim has been strongly disputed.43

But another reason may be just as important. Most of us are ready to deny some group its rights, but we usually can't agree on which group that should be. Sometimes we can agree, and then the disliked group may be in for real trouble. There have been times (1919 to 1920, and again in the early 1950s) when socialists and communists were disliked by most people in the United States. The government on each occasion took strong actions against them. Today, fewer people agree that these left-wing groups are a major domestic threat, and so their rights are now more secure.

Finally, the courts are sufficiently insulated from public opinion that they can act against majority sentiments and enforce constitutional protections (see Chapter 16). Most of us are not willing to give all rights to all groups, but most of us are not judges.

These facts should be a sober reminder that political liberty cannot be taken for granted. Men and women are not, it would seem, born with an inclination to live and let live, at least politically, and many—possibly most—never acquire that inclination. Liberty must be learned and protected. Happily, the United States during much of its recent history has not been consumed by a revulsion for any one group that has been strong enough to place the group's rights in jeopardy.

Nor should any part of society pretend that it is always more tolerant than another. In the 1950s, for example, ultraconservatives outside the universities were attacking the rights of professors to say and teach certain things. In the 1960s and 1970s, ultraliberal students and professors inside the universities were attacking the rights of other students and professors to say certain things.

The American system of government is supported by a political culture that fosters a sense of civic duty, takes pride in the nation's constitutional arrangements, and provides support for the exercise of essential civil liberties (albeit out of indifference or diversity more than principle at times). In recent decades, mistrust of government officials (though not of the system itself) has increased, and confidence in their responsiveness to popular feelings has declined.

Although Americans value liberty in both the political system and the economy, they believe equality is important in the political realm. In economic affairs, they wish to see equality of opportunity but accept inequality of results.

Not only is our culture generally supportive of democratic rule, it also has certain distinctive features that make our way of governing different from what one finds in other democracies. Americans are preoccupied with their rights, and this fact, combined with a political system that (as we shall see) encourages the vigorous exercise of rights and claims, gives to our political life an adversarial style. Unlike Swedes or Japanese, we do not generally reach political decisions by consensus, and we often do not defer to the authority of administrative agencies. American politics, more than that of many other nations, is shot through at every stage with protracted conflict.

But as we shall learn in the next chapter, that conflict is not easily described as, for example, always pitting liberals against conservatives. Not only do we have a lot of conflict, it is often messy conflict, a kind of political Tower of Babel. Foreign observers sometimes ask how we stand the confusion. The answer, of course, is that we have been doing it for more than 200 years. Maybe our Constitution is two centuries old, not in spite of this confusion, but because of it. We shall see.
WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

MEMORANDUM
To: White House Chief of Staff Omar McField
From: Secretary of Education Alexandra Clark
Subject: Civics education in schools

The decline in political knowledge that Americans have about our governmental system is alarming. We need to work in partnership with Congress and the states to promote civic education in secondary schools. In her upcoming State of the Union message, the President needs to make a case for high school civics education and endorse the creation of a bipartisan task force to develop guidelines for such classes.

Arguments for:
1. A recent survey finds that only about six of ten Americans can name the vice president, and more than half believe incorrectly that the Supreme Court prohibits public-school classes that compare world religions.
2. Schools have a responsibility to teach students the principles of American constitutionalism, such as federalism and separation of church and state.
3. If the federal government does not take the initiative in promoting civics education, then states will develop their own standards, which will weaken understanding of our shared political principles.

Your decision:
Support  Oppose

Arguments against:
1. Civics education needs to be incorporated into existing courses, not taught separately.
2. Individuals need to take responsibility for understanding the political system in which they live.
3. Based on their individual historical experiences, states are better prepared than the federal government to determine how the underlying principles of American politics should be taught in their classrooms.

News >>

U.S. Students Score Low Marks in Civics Study

A recent survey shows that only 24 percent of twelfth-graders scored proficient or higher in civics, a statistic that does not bode well for an informed and engaged U.S. citizenry.
LEARNING OBJECTIVES

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

✓ What is American political culture?
  American political culture refers to long-standing patterns in how people view government, politics, and the economy.

✓ How does political culture differ from political ideology?
  American political culture refers to views about how government should function and its guiding principles, whereas political ideology refers to specific views about which programs and policies government should pursue.

✓ Does the United States have a unique political culture compared to other advanced industrialized democracies?
  The question of whether the United States is “exceptional” among democracies sparks much debate among social scientists and historians, and while characteristics of American exceptionalism are difficult to identify and measure, surveys discussed in this chapter do show that Americans view government, politics, religion, and economics differently than citizens of other advanced industrialized democracies.

RECONSIDERING WHO GOVERNS?

1. Do Americans trust their government?
   More than it sometimes appears. Compared to the 1950s, we are much less likely to think the government does the right thing or cares about what we think. But when we look at our system of government—the Constitution and our political culture—we are very pleased with it. Americans are much more patriotic than people in many other democracies. And we display a great deal of support for churches in large measure because we are more religious than most Europeans.

2. Why do we accept great differences in wealth and income?
   We believe in equality of opportunity and not equality of results. Wealthy people may have more political influence than ordinary folks, but if we think they earned their money through their own efforts and if they follow legal rules, we have no complaint about their wealth.
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. How do people in other nations view American democracy?
2. How have the American public’s views about the meaning of such constitutional principles as liberty and equality for government policies evolved over time?
3. With the massive growth in the U.S. population in the last century, what are Americans’ expectations for representative democracy, federalism, and public officials in the 21st century?
4. What are the central principles of American political culture, and how are they reflected in the founding documents of the United States, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Federalist/Antifederalist papers?
5. How do Americans differ from citizens of other democracies in their views about government and politics, and what factors may help to explain this difference?
6. How can Americans differ so strongly in political ideology and still share the same political culture? How might growing political polarization in the United States pose risks for American political culture?

TO LEARN MORE

Polling organizations that frequently measure aspects of political culture:

www.roper.com
www.gallup.com

U.S. Census Bureau: www.census.gov


the arguments of those who do and do not believe that a culture war exists.


Putnam, Robert D. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000. An important argument that American political culture has been harmed by the decline in membership in organizations that bring people together for communal activities.
